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Foreword and a Summary of Key Findings 
Colonel, Lic.Pol.Sci. Juha Pyykönen 
Director, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies 
National Defence University of Finland  
 
 
The armed forces in the Western world have been in transition for some 
years now. The key question has most often been what sort of roles and 
missions will there be for the armed forces in the 21st century. Logically, 
the follow-up question has related to the request for capabilities, capacities 
and assets. Governments struggling with shrinking defence budgets have 
also pondered whether rationalisation at some level could be a solution, or 
at least a part of a solution. This could be seen relevant among neighbours, 
who no longer pose any threat on another, and/or are members of the same 
military or political alliance. In addition to, for example, reducing force 
levels, a wider division of responsibilities for maintaining and developing 
military capabilities has been addressed. 
 
The tenth Suomenlinna Seminar was primarily organised in order to find 
some answers to the questions listed above. The participants were asked to 
elaborate the question of what sort of roles and missions for the armed 
forces should be dedicated by the year 2020. To set the scene for the 
seminar, the first session was dedicated to illustrate a future of emerging 
security threats and conventional war.  
 
The ultimate goal for the seminar was to search for new ideas and new 
perspectives as how to best utilise existing national military resources to 
meet challenges posed by future security threats. As a point of departure, a 
hypothesis was that similar challenges would apply very much throughout 
the whole of the Western world.  
 
In addition to traditional speaker presentations and to facilitate 
brainstorming, new ideas and perspectives to pop up, five working groups 
were established based on participants’ expertise and knowledge. A 
chairperson and a supporting staff member were also assigned. Each 
working group received a skeleton diagram on which they were asked to 
illustrate possible roles, issues, topics, qualities or capabilities that they 
regarded as most relevant in this context. Furthermore, there were two 
categories for relevant issues, namely one for the current situation (2007) 
and one for relevant ones in 2020.  
 
As a short summary, the following issues, inter alia, were addressed by the 
working groups. 
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Most prominent future threats were deemed to be terrorism, regional crisis, 
internal instability and conflicts and information warfare. Each of the 
groups found the problem of identifying the enemy problematic. Quite 
interestingly, a more conventional threat of arms race and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction were generally regarded to pose a serious 
threat also in the future.  
 
As a response to the threats stated above, crucial future roles for the armed 
forces were judged to be homeland defence, humanitarian relief, support of 
the civilians and internal crisis management. Most commonly stated future 
military capabilities were expeditionary missions, intelligence and 
information operations, civilian-military cooperation and force protection.  
 
There was a strong common agreement that a more complex operating 
environment has emerged, already today. Difference between “war” and 
“peace” situations was quite often characterised as “blurred”. On the other 
hand, a deep interconnectedness of all the elements of threats, roles and 
capabilities was recognised leading us to a situation where we are 
continuously in an unspecified space. The proper management of these 
crises entails a combination of various military and civilian capabilities. 
There should be no going back to separate action by the military or the 
civilians. On the contrary, crisis management has become a comprehensive 
and holistic enterprise. 
 
One of the key findings was that the military’s gradually changing role in 
security is bringing it from present military capabilities to less violent 
oriented and more multiple issues such as security, stabilization and 
reconstruction. It was often mentioned that it looks like the other powers 
and authorities than the military seem to gain extra leverage. Even though 
in many cases military victory may be indispensable, it will not guarantee 
success as such. Rather, the success will be measured by objectives beyond 
the simple military victory. 
 
The working groups envisioned a smaller and “smarter” military to meet 
these demands. A number of tangible elements needs to be developed to the 
extent that the demands on tomorrow’s armed forces seem almost 
overwhelmingly diverse: while they are expected both to sustain their 
traditional defence capabilities and to be prepared to participate in military 
as well as humanitarian missions in distant regions, they are simultaneously 
expected to efficiently cooperate with civilian authorities and to have 
extensive knowledge of different cultures and languages. To fulfil these 
demands, future forces should be able to operate in changing roles of a 
conventional soldier, a military policeman, a reconstruction worker and an 
expert on civilian society’s institutions and administration. 
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When facing all these versatile demands, nations should concentrate on 
prioritization and cooperation. Limited national resources are forcing 
nations to prioritize operations they are going to participate, most likely by 
considering which one serves their national interest most and also 
respecting demands produced by the possible alliances. Taking into 
consideration all these demands, it seems quite self-evident that 
international cooperation would be a logical choice to combine limited 
national resources and to complement each others’ deficiencies.  
 
The reader will find more profound analysis in the following chapters. The 
organising party found it very informative to collect and analyse numerous 
and varying views and perspectives of participating professionals. Of 
course, no final solution or guidance is offered here, but some insights and 
food for thought for further elaboration is provided in this publication.  
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The Future of Major and Minor Wars 
Raimo Väyrynen 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
 
 
Changes in the character and functions of warfare are not accidental 
development, but they display long-term trend and underlying structural 
transformations. Although the exact nature of the future warfare is 
unknown, there are ways to peak into the future and argue, among other 
things, that the probability of a large-scale war between major powers has 
been and will continue to diminish. If this is the case, the era of the total 
war may be drawing to an end. In fact, the risk of unlimited warfare has 
been an exception in the history. 
 
 
Military Technology and Society 
 
Feudal wars were limited in many ways. The capabilities of warring parties 
were restricted and often were inadequate to destroy the enemy even if the 
intention might have existed. In feudal warfare also a code of chivalry, 
informed by early Christian principles, existed; the aim was not to fight to 
extinction, but rather to measure which side was preponderant and then 
cease the fighting until new circumstances forced to resume it. In effect, 
constraints in the feudal warfare were very political and even moral in 
nature. On the other hand, the objectives of the feudal warfare were not 
equally political but they concerned more the reallocation of landed 
property and labor force. Feudal warfare came to an end as a result of the 
gradual demise of feudalism itself. 
 
From the 14th century on, the development of military technology started to 
shape more directly the pattern of warfare. Fire weapons became more 
common and they required a better trained and organized military force. 
The number of troops multiplied and their tactical uses became more 
flexible. Warfare called for bigger investments of money by the monarchs 
who fell badly in debt as a result. From the 16th century on European 
armies experienced a military revolution spearheaded by the Dutch and 
Swedish armies. The expansion of the military forces, often containing a 
strong mercenary element, inaugurated a period of continent-wide wars of 
which the Thirty Years War is a prominent example. 
 
The naval technology and warfare also assumed new dimensions, partly as 
a result of the global acquisition of colonies and naval bases. Thus, the 
transportation revolution had also military implications and major powers 
started to fight wars with each other even outside Europe (e.g. Ten Years 
War in North America between Britain and France). Colonial wars pitted 
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the expeditionary forces from the North in an asymmetric fashion against 
the indigenous forces of the South. The Russian expansion to Siberia 
provides vivid evidence on how badly the conquering expeditions dealt 
with the local “small” people. While the “highest stage of imperialism” did 
not result in a generalized war between major powers, the colonial wars 
remained an international phenomenon until the 1970s when Portugal left 
its African colonies. 
 
The French Revolution opened a new chapter in the history of warfare by 
making it a mass phenomenon. In fact, the Napoleonic wars have been 
called the first total war. Lévee en masse organized by France aimed at the 
extensive mobilization of the nation for war. The Napoleonic mass armies 
were able to reach, among other places, Egypt and the gates of Moscow, 
but these operations also showed that the limits on national resources and 
the logistical problems of far-flung operations restricted military 
effectiveness and political success. Yet, the era of mass armies had started 
and warfare had been transformed into a more costly and destructive affair. 
The long peace of the 19th century limited – with some exceptions, such as 
the Crimean War - the destructiveness of wars, but the issue itself did not 
disappear. 
 
 
The Lethal Century 
 
Niall Ferguson has called the 19th century as “the lethal century” because of 
the enormity of destruction brought about by the “war of the worlds”, to 
quote Ferguson again. The new scale of destructiveness became very 
obvious in World War I, when mass armies fought each other for some four 
years in the “Great War”. Soldiers were killed in the trenches by the 
millions and new military technologies were adopted. The era of cavalry 
was not yet quite over, but the demise of old military traditions had started. 
 
Sometimes World War I has been called the chemists’ war as a result of the 
use of chemical weapons at Somme and Verdun (while World War II has 
been called the physicists’ war because of the development and use of the 
atomic bomb). It can be argued that the long duration and extensive human 
and material destruction in World War I sparked a cultural change in public 
thinking on war; instead of a heroic encounter, war was increasingly 
perceived as an ugly and detestable institution. The establishment of the 
League of Nations and formulations in its Covenant provide testimony on 
the turning of tide in the attitudes towards warfare. 
 
The turn was not, however, strong enough to avert the occurrence of 
another great-power war, i.e. World War II. A main reason for the return of 
a major war was that the Paris Peace Treaty in 1919 was unable to create a 
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stable and legitimate international order and thus permitted the return to 
political and military rivalry in Europe. The rise of nationalism, economic 
protectionism, and fascism fuelled further that competition. World War II 
was even more destructive than World War I; it was a genuine global war 
and its destructiveness was further added by the strategic bombings in 
Europe and the employment of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August 1945. 
 
 
The Waning of Great-power War 
 
World War I created a collective trauma on the nature and consequences of 
the modern war and this trauma was further deepened by the experiences of 
World War II. In the popular opinion in Europe, the feelings of “never 
again” and “without us” became widespread. A sort of taboo emerged 
against the large-scale use of force and it was directed especially against 
nuclear weapons and their use. It is undeniable that the development and 
use of nuclear weapons has been the single most important military 
revolution in the world history. My contention is that the waning of major 
war – i.e. a war between great powers – is the key legacy of World War II. 
No such war has been waged since 1945, although both the Korean War 
and the Vietnam War brought them into an indirect confrontation with each 
other. 
 
The fear of total destruction – that the use of nuclear weapons would bring 
about – sealed the end of the great-power war. There were, of course, also 
other factors that influenced in the same direction, such as the 
establishment of multilateral institutions – especially the United Nations – 
and the strengthening of the normative framework against major war. Thus, 
while nuclear deterrence and bipolarity helped to stem warfare between 
major powers, there have been also institutional and normative changes that 
have contributed to this peaceful revolution in international affairs. 
 
It is interesting that the decreasing probability of war among the major 
powers has co-existed with the institutionalization of a territorial 
international system of sovereign nation states; the “territorial covenant” as 
some scholars likes to call it. Growing economic interdependence, or 
globalization, has obviously created common material interests that have 
mitigated the urge to go to war. Yet, I would argue that the emergence of a 
more civilized system of sovereign states has been a more important reason 
for the waning of major war than economic globalization per se. 
 
Obviously, it is not credible to maintain that a war between great powers 
will not ever occur again, even though we have had a peace between them 
for over sixty years. I am quite confident, however, that it is unlikely that 
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we will face in the future a power transition that would lead to a major war 
as established theories of political realism would suggest. It is conceivable 
that China will go through a “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”, as 
the official Chinese doctrine claims, rather than fight a “hegemonic war” 
with the United States, the “declining hegemony”. In the new 
circumstances, we may have to rewrite a bit of Clausewitz and argue that 
the resort to major wars is about to be replaced by other means, economic 
and political competition peppered only by a limited use of force and 
coercion. 
 
The argument made above does not mean that war and violence are 
disappearing from the face of the earth. Statistics on warfare show clearly 
that since the 1960s the number of wars between states has been in decline. 
It is still possible that two states, especially in the South, fight a rather 
traditional border war, as has happened between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or 
might in some circumstances occur between India and Pakistan.  Even in 
such cases, external powers or international organizations would step in, 
however, and try to stop the war and demarcate the border as has been tried 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Because of the “territorial covenant”, it is 
difficult to imagine that even medium or small powers would be permitted 
to fight a prolonged war across national borders.   
 
Another reason for the decline in the utility of war is that the meaning of 
victory has become more and more elusive. In a border war, a state may 
acquire thousands of square miles of territory, but if that is largely inarable 
land, what benefit does it bring about for either side in the war? Moreover, 
in “new wars” the concept of victory is difficult to apply; violent 
encounters are asymmetric and while weaker side cannot necessarily win in 
any strategic sense, it may be able to tie down the stronger party in a 
manner that its political position becomes untenable both internationally 
and at home. The political functions of violence are also becoming more 
blurred and its use is often motivated by greed and the search of lootable 
resources. 
 
Recent developments in Afghanistan and Iraq show beyond any doubt that 
the expectation of a brief and victorious war is as unrealistic, although in 
different circumstances, as they were in the two world wars of the “lethal 
century”.   
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The Perseverance of Military Interventions 
 
All this does not mean that war and violence are vanishing. In some 
respects, the use of violence is well and alive, but its nature and functions 
have changed. This is evidenced at least by two trends discernible in 
international relations; the continuing resort to military interventions and 
the rise of small-scale, local violence. Military intervention is not a rare 
phenomenon in international politics; by one count, some 300 interventions 
have been carried out after World War II. Military interventions do not 
constitute any single, coherent category of action but they come in many 
shapes and sizes. Moreover, one can discern some changing trends in their 
character and objectives. 
 
Military interventions by a single state against another, usually weaker state 
are becoming less common. One of the reasons for this development might 
be that previously interventions were conducted by major powers against 
dependent states. Often this dependence was created by colonial 
relationships and interventions were used to stop the search of national 
independence; e.g. the Dutch intervention in Indonesia in the late 1940s or 
the French intervention in Algeria in the early 1960s. Another possibility 
was the use of military force in center-periphery relationships against 
recalcitrant states; e.g. the interventions by the United States in Central 
America and Caribbean. 
 
Now that the global colonial system has been abolished, the need of 
unilateral military interventions by the preponderant power has all but 
disappeared (although the Russian fighting in Chechnya can possibly be 
placed in this category). Of course, major powers have not completely 
mended their bad habits, but their use of interventionary force happens in a 
different context. In particular, the interventions are now quite often carried 
out by multilateral coalitions (in which there is often a lead nation). The 
search of a multilateral solution and the blessing of an international 
organization – either the United Nations or regional organizations – hints to 
the importance states attach to the collective legitimation of their military 
operations. Even the United States, which is prone to use unilateral force, 
tries to establish “coalitions of the willing” to support its military activities. 
 
The ideal type of military intervention is a peacekeeping operation decided 
by the UN Security Council. The aim is to send in international troops 
which have the task of ending the war and preventing relapse to violence. It 
is well-known that the United Nations is today involved in more military 
operations than ever in its history; in the field, there are more 100,000 
“blue helmets” from a greater number of countries than ever before (though 
dwarfed by the presence of 170,000 U.S. troops in Iraq alone). Many of 
these operations are informed by the humanitarian motive enshrined in the 
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new doctrine on the “responsibility to protect. The doctrine was enunciated 
a few years ago by an international commission and strongly advocated by 
Kofi Annan when he served as the UN Secretary General. 
 
The humanitarian motive is a noble and necessary one. It is true, though, 
that it has been applied in an uneven manner and, even if applied, the 
results have remained incomplete. It is simply very difficult to bring peace 
to places like the Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia (which also 
provides an example on the mixture of a unilateral Ethiopian and 
multilateral intervention). In addition, the Security Council may be 
incapable to act due to disagreements among its permanent members. At a 
minimum, the decision to act is delayed by the opposition by one or more 
permanent members as happened in the case of Darfur in which China was 
reluctant to agree on any kind of intervention that the Sudanese government 
disliked. 
 
Darfur provides also evidence on the rise of regional organizations in 
peacekeeping and crisis management. The Darfur peacekeeping operation, 
launched by the UN Security Council in August 2007, is a large “hybrid” 
operation by the African Union and the United Nations. The contribution of 
industrialized countries is necessary because the African Union does not 
possess adequate material, logistical, and organizational capabilities to 
conduct a successful operation in such a vast area as Darfur. Yet, the trend 
seems to be pointing in the direction that regional organizations are taking 
a greater responsibility to restore and keep peace by military means in local 
hotspots (an interesting case to follow is whether ASEAN will assume a 
role in keeping peace in some of the volatile Pacific islands where 
Australia is now the key regional power). 
 
The role of regional organizations in peacekeeping and crisis management 
concerns also the mandate of intervention. Today, in international law, only 
the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) has the mandate to launch military operations. However, 
OSCE has not conducted a single military operation so far, while in the UN 
the Security Council may be blocked to act by the veto of a permanent 
majority or the majority of the Council. This has raises the question on 
whether other international organizations should assume a power to give a 
mandate for a military intervention. The mandate issue is different from the 
leadership in the conduct of an operation. So far, NATO has not directly 
mandated a crisis management operation, but has, for instance, directed the 
ISAF operation in Afghanistan since 2004. 
 
The European Union has been moving farther in this regard. Although the 
EU has shied away from competing with the United Nations, it has in 
reality its own procedures in the European Security and Defence Policy to 
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decide on its crisis management operations. These procedures have been 
further specified in the Reform Treaty that is now in the process of revision 
and conclusion. Moreover, the EU is gaining experience in the conduct of 
crisis management operations in Bosnia, but also in places like Aceh and 
Lebanon where it mobilized troops from member countries operating under 
the UN. It appears that in the future the workload of the EU in crisis 
management will continue to increase, the establishment of battle groups is 
beefing up its operational capabilities, and it will be increasingly sought as 
a partner in various types of hybrid operations involving also the UN and 
regional organizations. It is an open issue to what extent the EU is prepared 
to participate in hybrid operations or whether it prefers to go alone in crisis 
management. 
 
 
New Types of Local Violence 
 
Another new trend in global violence, apart from the growing resort to 
various types of military interventions, concerns the rise of “micro-
violence”. In a sense, terrorism can be identified by that label as terrorist 
strikes are specific and sporadic uses of violence to obtain political goals. 
The humanitarian consequences of terrorism have been vastly exaggerated 
as the number of people killed in terrorist attacks has remained limited and 
dwarfs in comparison to the number of victims of other kinds of violence. 
In fact, a more important form of micro-violence is the systematic killing 
and maiming of people in local conflicts. I am not speaking only on civil 
wars, but even more limited uses of violence.  
 
As the number of interstate wars have experienced a long-term declining 
trend, the number of civil wars increased in the 1990s, especially its first 
half. Since then, also the number of civil wars has decreased which gives 
reason to believe the world is becoming a more peaceful place (though 
there is evidence that during the last couple of years civil wars have slightly 
increased again). This conclusion may be, however, erroneous and based 
on too a narrow conception of violence. For this reason, we need a more 
nuanced concept of micro-violence. It should capture also such forms of 
deadly violence in which the parties are not necessarily well organized and 
the state may not even be a party. Many a civil war in Africa displays 
elements of such an informal and unorganized, yet deadly violence.  
 
To take an example, India, as a democratic and growing nation, is not 
usually considered to be at war. Even leaving aside the occasional pogroms 
between Hindus and Muslims, this perception may not be correct, though. 
In reality, an undeclared civil war has raged in states like Assam and Bihar. 
In the impoverished Bihar alone, 2000 people were killed in political 
violence in 2006. Few years ago, South Africa was in the throes of a 
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similar pandemic of violence, while parts of Brazil may serve as yet 
another example. In many countries, which as a whole might live in peace, 
there are violent environments in which physical violence, economic crisis, 
environmental destruction, and human rights violations accumulate into a 
humanitarian crisis. 
 
The rapid pace of urbanization is creating entirely new social conditions for 
violence on which there is little reliable statistical information on the 
number of victims. In today’s world, there are 20 mega-city regions with 
more than ten million people and 450 city regions with over one million 
residents. An increasing number of large and growing city regions are in 
the South. The urban forms in various mega-city regions differ from each 
other, but one of their common features is segregation of people into 
different habitats. The social distance from the business center to the slums 
is often much longer than the physical distance. Unequal social conditions 
foster violence that has a class character; the kidnapping of business people 
is a lucrative profession in many large metropolitan areas. As a result, 
helicopters are increasingly popular vehicles for business people moving 
from one place to another in a city like Sao Paulo.   
 
Urban violence has both economic and political motives. Gangs may be 
fighting each other, for instance, for the control of the local drug market. In 
the 1990s, the number of homicides peaked annual to over one hundred in 
Gary, Indiana, a city of 100.000 people as the drug gangs from Chicago 
and Detroit were engaged in violent struggles. To calm down the situation, 
the Governor of Indiana had to send state troopers in this former home 
town of U.S. Steel. More generally, gang bosses in the large slum areas are 
establishing private armies to secure their political control of and economic 
access to the growing shanty towns. Cities like Johannesburg, Karachi, 
Nairobi, and Sao Paulo are infested with violent crime from which the local 
people suffer most. 
 
It may be said that growing urban violence is not a security issue, but the 
problem for the crime control. This is true, of course, but still the question 
is about physical violence. Ultimately, for an individual it may not make 
much of a difference whether s/he is a victim of war or criminal violence. 
In addition, public agencies are necessarily part in the control of violent 
crime; not only the police but in some cases also the army. For instance, the 
Brazilian government had to send in the army to control violence in the 
favelas of Sao Paulo. 
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Conclusion 
 
We are living in a divided world. On the one hand, it is becoming a more 
peaceful place. The risk of a major war between great powers is minimal 
and this happy situation seems to continue in the foreseeable future. 
Although organized civil wars are a distinct possibility, especially in the 
South, even their number and destructiveness are in decline. Violence in 
bloody civil wars in Angola, DR of Congo, Liberia, and Sudan is under 
some control. In other words, the use of organized military force either 
between states or inside them seems to become rarer and less destructive. 
However, trend is only a trend and cannot exclude the possibility of large-
scale violent encounters and even genocides. 
 
This does not mean that peace has come to the face of earth. Large-scale 
violence in developed countries is reasonably well controlled, although 
occasional terrorist strikes and violent ethnic protests are a distinct 
possibility. The risk of micro-violence is much higher in the unstable areas 
of the South in which it has become a method of business and politics and 
even a way of life. Traditional methods of intervention, from peacekeeping 
to the unilateral use of force, are hardly feasible in quelling such violence. 
The control of violence is becoming more and more a police problem on 
which the rise of the civilian crisis management and the need to coordinate 
it with the military operations is a telling sign. 
 
Raimo Väyrynen is the director of the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs and former president and Director General of the Academy of 
Finland.  
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Emerging Security Threats 
Robert Dalsjö1
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) 
 
 
Providing a picture of emerging security threats presents problems on 
several levels. Events and trends on the world stage seem to whirl like the 
pieces of a kaleidoscope. And any assessment or prediction is fraught with 
uncertainty. We cannot know which bombs will go off and which will 
fizzle. And we cannot see all bombs. Still, it seems possible to highlight a 
number of factors and threats which deserve our attention. Some of these 
are of ‘new’ or untraditional nature, at least when it comes to being the 
focus of attention. Others are more traditional in nature, but are new in the 
shape they take. I will start out by looking at some of the threats which 
involve new types of actors or manners of warfare, such as Jihadism, and 
then move on to look at threats emanating from major states increasingly 
unsatisfied with the status quo. I will end with some rather bleak 
perspectives concerning the West’s ability to deal with these threats 
 
 
Asymmetric Conflicts 
 
As concerns new actors and forms of warfare, it seems natural to use as a 
point of departure two perspectives first presented in the early 1990s, but 
still highly relevant in the debate. 
 
The first perspective was presented by Martin van Creveld in his book The 
Transformation of War, published in 1990. His basic argument, which is 
based on Israeli experiences in Lebanon, is that the West’s war machine 
has become so effective that any opponent which appears in a conventional 
and symmetric military form will simply be blown away. Thus our 
opponents will – unless they are stupid – chose other routes, such as 
asymmetric warfare conducted by a guerrilla dressed in civilian clothes and 
using civilian vehicles. With their ability to blend in with the population, 
they will conduct hit-and-run attacks, which will be very hard to counter. 
Van Creveld pointed out that 90% of all military inventions since the 
advent of gunpowder are based on the premise that you can easily identify 
your opponent in the field. When this premise no longer holds, much of our 
sophisticated gear becomes useless.  
                                                 
1 The author is a Senior Analyst with the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI. He 
is, however, solely responsible for the content of this paper, which does not necessarily 
reflect the position of FOI, or of the Swedish government. In the editing, a few 
references have been added to events that took place between the seminar and the 
delivery of the manuscript. 
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Asymmetric warfare, or counter-insurgency (COIN), is one of the most 
difficult tasks a military force can engage in, even for the very best of 
armies. The record of successful cases since 1945 is rather short, while the 
list of losses is long: the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, Algeria, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon are but a few examples. Today we 
have Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. The Ethiopians are finding that like 
Baghdad, Mogadishu is easy to take, but hard to hold.  
 
Asymmetric warfare and methods of counterinsurgencies currently attract a 
lot of attention, both within the military services of the great powers, and 
within the international academic community. Despite abundant writings, 
there are no fireproof recipes that work in practice. That is, at least, unless 
one applies methods from the Old Testament, which hardly is our line of 
business.  
 
Most writings on the subject emphasise the need for bringing together 
assets of very different kinds – military, humanitarian, police, medical etc – 
in a concerted two-prong effort to help the population and win their 
support, while at the same time combating and marginalising the militants. 
There are different labels for this: comprehensive approach, integrated 
approach, whole-of-government approach, etc, but the basic message is 
similar. 
 
In Sweden, we are having some difficulties in making progress on this 
matter. Apart from the usual resistance to change found in almost any 
organisation, and the ever-present problem of turf, there seems to be two 
main causes. One is that large parts of the humanitarian and developmental 
community find working together with ‘the military’ highly unpalatable, 
and they resist what they see as encroachments on their autonomy and on 
the ‘purity’ of aid. While such an attitude may be understandable and 
acceptable among non-governmental organisations, such as the ICRC or 
MSF, it is rather inappropriate when it comes to state agencies dealing with 
aid and development. In many parts of the world, such as Darfur or Tchad, 
it is patently clear that the outside world cannot help the long-suffering 
people to rebuild their lives, unless the there is a military force that 
provides security for both inhabitants and aid workers. In other places, such 
as Afghanistan, it is equally clear that we will not have progress on 
bringing peace and the rule of law to that country unless common people 
see improvements of their daily lives. Development needs security, and 
security needs development, and they have to work hand in hand. Given 
this, it seems reasonable that –if the Swedish government decides to help 
the people of e.g. Chad, all the relevant agencies of government should act 
together in support of a common goal. 
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Another, although somewhat lesser, problem is that there are still some in 
the Swedish body politic and government agencies who are uncomfortable 
with the very notion of doing counter-insurgency, which does fit well with 
their self-image. Counterinsurgency is something done by amoral and 
brutal great powers, not by nice little countries like Sweden, the line might 
go. The experiences from Bosnia in 1993-1995 led most of Sweden’s 
public and professional opinion to not only accept chapter VII operations 
and the use of force, but to embrace them. But remnants of old thinking 
remain, and there is some way to go before the systems realises that COIN 
is the order of the day. After all, almost all of the operations that we have 
engaged in later years – Bosnia, Liberia, Congo, Afghanistan – are 
counterinsurgencies on one form or other. We need to acknowledge this 
and draw the consequences. 
 
 
A Clash of Civilisations? 
 
The second big thought on emerging threats is still, whether one likes it or 
not, Samuel Huntington’s notion of a clash of civilisations, first presented 
in the early 1990s. Simplified, his basic thesis is that that the end of the 
ideological conflict between communism and liberal democracy, and the 
dissolution of the communist ‘camp’, emphasised the existence of 
culturally defined entities, and the risk that some of these might come into 
conflict with each other. The most obvious candidate for such a conflict is 
between the Islamic world and the group of states whose cultures have 
grown out of the Western form of Christianity. While Huntington’s ideas 
are controversial – or even reviled – in some quarters, the fact that they are 
still discussed almost 15 years after the original article, testifies to their 
power. Moreover, the debate over whether Turkey should be allowed to 
join the EU shows that his idea of cultural fault lines is not only an 
academic construction. I also believe that many people in Finland and in 
the Baltic states are very much aware of a similar fault line along their 
eastern borders; it is no coincidence that the coats of arms of Finland and of 
Karelia contain symbols of this. 
 
 
9/11 and Jihadism- a Fusion of Van Creveld and Huntington 
 
Al Qaeda’s strike against the twin towers, with forerunners in earlier strikes 
at the same place and against US embassies in Africa, represented a fusion 
of Van Creveld’s asymmetric insurgencies with Huntington’s clash 
between the West and militant Islam. Even if some in the West refuse to 
accept the existence of such a conflict, this is still clearly how many within 
militant Islam see it. And thus it becomes a reality, whether we like it or 
not. This struggle is not confined to places like Afghanistan, Iraq or 
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Somalia. Neither are the lines of conflict drawn in places like the Bosporus 
or the Mediterranean. The lines are now drawn in our own countries and 
cities, and that is also where part of the struggle is waged: Madrid, London, 
Amsterdam may just be the first in a long line.  
 
Depressingly, this is not only a matter of a failure to integrate immigrants 
with Moslem backgrounds into our societies. It also seems to be a failure of 
integration achieving the expected results. Many of the suicide-bombers in 
Britain, as well as the youth that murdered the Dutch film-maker Van 
Gogh, were second- or third generation immigrants who had previously 
lived a ‘Western’ life. One of the London bombers even spoke with a 
Yorkshire accent. Thus, the outward signs of integration does not immunise 
youth against the seductive radicalisation that takes place in some mosques, 
in prisons, and not least over the internet.  
 
For a number of years now, there has been much confident talk in military 
and industrial circles in America and in Sweden about ‘Network Centric 
Warfare’ and of how new types of information technology would help us 
wage war much more effectively in the future. Likewise, there are ideas 
about a 4th generation of warfare, in which media and the internet are used 
to create effects directly on the target. It seems ironic that the first to have 
put such ideas effectively into practice have been the Jihadists. While these 
capabilities are in the West still mostly promises on power-point slides, 
Jihadists have already successfully used existing network tools, such as the 
internet and mobile phones, to attract proselytes, spread propaganda, and 
coordinate activities and strikes. That an amorphous group of hateful young 
men advocating a violent return to the Middle Ages would beat the 
Western military-industrial complex by about a decade or so, is a both 
sobering and worrying thought.  
 
 
A Long War? 
 
It has been suggested that parallels could be drawn between the current 
struggle against militant Islam, and the struggle against Communism which 
dominated much of the 20th century. In both cases, it is argued, it is an 
ideological struggle with a need for a long-term approach, containing the 
enemy abroad until it crumbles under its own weight and contradictions, 
while simultaneously neutralising and marginalising the enemies within. 
According to this view, today’s militant Islamists in our countries would be 
akin to the Communists in our societies from the 1920s to about the 1970s 
(whereafter they became a marginal sect). A key role in defeating the 
Communist threat within was played by Social Democracy, which helped 
win the allegiance of workers to the democratic state. Our problem is that 
when it comes to today’s militant Islam, we are still, so to say, before the 
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party rifts of 1917. The Islamist movement has not yet split into discernible 
revolutionary and reformist camps. And any movement in such a direction 
has to come from within, if it is to have any chance of succeeding. It must 
be genuine and cannot be orchestrated from the outside. I at least, have not 
seen any signs of this taking place, so far. 
 
 
Other Clouds on the Horizon 
 
The current focus on the challenge of Jihadism must not cause us to neglect 
a number of other factors which could cause us serious problems in the 
close to mid-term perspective. Limitations of time and space mean that 
most of these will only be signposted here, however.  
 
Nationalism is on the rise in some parts of the world, including areas close 
to us. So is religion, not just Islam. Swedes tend to see nationalism and 
religion as 19th century phenomena, which mankind leaves behind in his 
assent to modernity. We thus tend to underestimate the attraction and 
power of these forces, but we do it at our cost.  
 
Failed states are still with us and continue to cause serious problems. The 
same applies to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and 
precision-guided weapons, which are accelerating. Combine these two into 
the failure of a state armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, 
such as Pakistan or North Korea, and we have the recipe for a night-mare. 
Then we have globalisation, which slowly but inexorably changes the 
relative weight of states and of groups within states, as well as resistance to 
globalisation and its effects. And we have –partly as a result of 
globalisation, probably also of climate change – increasing competition for 
resources, including water and energy.  
 
 
The Rise of China 
 
A case which captures many of the aspects mentioned above is the rise of 
China, with all its implications concerning economic matters, access to 
resources, political aspirations, and military might. The current really 
existing situation in mainland China is an odd and very un-Marxist 
combination of a Marxist-Leninist political system and a mostly free 
market economy. The question of how long this contradiction can last is 
highly relevant. One can hardly rule out that the Chinese Communists will 
perform a manoeuvre similar to that performed by the Yugoslav 
Communists in the 1980s. When Milosevic and his ilk saw that Marx and 
Lenin were losing the power to legitimize their rule, they changed shirts 
and became nationalists. But riding the tiger of nationalism can be a very 
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dangerous exercise. Fanning the flames of conflict with neighbouring 
countries is part of the package, but at some stage leaders might come to a 
situation where they would have to choose between going from a war of 
words to a real war, and backing down in a humiliating manner. A 
government unsure about its domestic position might be more prone to take 
a risk in foreign policy, as did the Argentine generals in 1981. There are 
those that see parallels between the current situation in eastern Asia and 
Europe before 1914.  
 
 
Resurgent Russia 
 
Closer to home we have a resurgent Russia. The fact that Russia is 
recovering from the political turbulence and economic meltdown of the 
1990s need not in itself be a reason for worry. What is worrying are the 
clear signs – which only fools could ignore – that Russia’s internal and 
external policies are heading in an ominous direction. Internally, society 
and politics are becoming openly authoritarian. Stability has been achieved, 
but at the expense of democracy. Media has been brought under the 
Kremlin’s control, parliament has been tamed, and the oligarchs neutered. 
The tiny opposition parties that exist are beaten up by legions of riot police 
if they try to demonstrate in the streets. Critical journalists and dissidents 
are murdered – even abroad – or locked up in mental hospitals. Ex-KBG-
men hold many of the reins of power, and corruption is rampant. Nostalgia 
for the Soviet era is manifest, and the Kremlin has decreed that schools 
must use a history book that glosses over Stalin’s crimes and highlights 
Soviet achievements. Violent xenophobia and extreme nationalism is 
common, and thousands march openly under the swastika. The Kremlin has 
its own Nashi youth movement to harass and attack undesirables, including 
diplomats and dissidents. It seems as if Putin is trying to recreate the Soviet 
Union, but without communism. 
 
In the 1980s, it was not uncommon to refer to the Soviet Union as ‘Upper 
Volta with rockets’. Today’s Russia might likewise be called ‘Nigeria with 
nuclear missiles’. And one might, as Michael Clemmesen has, add ‘with a 
pre-1914 mindset’.2 The growing prosperity of latter years is almost 
entirely due to the rise in energy prices. But the Kremlin’s bulging coffers 
has nonetheless led to a palatable increase in Russia’s assertiveness vis-à-
vis the outside world. The cooperative stance taken after 9/11 has been 
replaced by a role as spoiler of the West’s plans and as bully of small 
neighbours, reminiscent of the Primakov years. Energy supplies are openly 
used as a weapon to blackmail former Soviet Republics to return to the 
fold, and to sow division within the EU and Nato. Defence spending is 
                                                 
2 http://blog.clemmesen.org/2007/04/29/28407-the-mayhem-in-tallinn/ 
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increasing rapidly, albeit from a small base, and there is a clear focus on 
new nuclear missiles as a vehicle to greatness. Such fundamentals of the 
post-Cold war order in Europe as the INF- and CFE treaties are now openly 
challenged by Russia. The West is seen, or at least depicted, as Russia’s 
natural adversary. Zero-sum thinking is pervasive, as it was in the Soviet 
years, and any gain for the West is seen as Russia’s loss, and vice versa. In 
a similar manner, the Kremlin obviously sees power as the ability kick 
others around and to make them fear you, as in American gangster films. 
Any ‘disrespect’ in the form of challenges by former subjects begets a 
brutal response, pour encourager les autres. The spectacular murder of 
Litvinenko should be seen in this light, as should Moscow’s blatant 
overreaction last year to Georgia’s arrest of four Russian officers, and this 
year to Estonia’s to relocation of a Red Army monument. The cyber-attack 
on Estonia that followed was massive and skilfully executed, bringing vital 
functions of that highly-wired country to a standstill. Whether this should 
be considered as an ‘armed attack’ is still an open issue, but hardly the fact 
that Russia’s behaviour gives reason for worry. 
 
 
Bleak Prospects and a Rerun of the 1970s? 
 
All together, the elements presented above adds to a rather unpalatable 
cocktail of rising threats to our security, in a wide sense. And we will be 
facing these as the period of unipolarity, which followed the demise of the 
USSR, is drawing to a close. America has overstretched itself in Iraq, and 
has lost the very strong hand it held.  
 
A power as strong as the US was recently can seem as omnipotent and 
invincible. But when this image is shattered, the reduction in standing and 
in influence can be dramatic. Losses can also include soft power and 
attraction, if the dominant power is seen to abuse power and commit acts of 
savagery. This is happening in Iraq, maybe also in Afghanistan. It has 
happened before, in Vietnam.  
 
In the early 1960s, the US was not only respected but almost adored in the 
Western world, American products and American ways of doing things 
were seen in a very positive light, and emulated. Ten years later, this 
situation had been overturned, and America withdrew with shame from 
Vietnam. 
 
Today’s situation concerning Iraq has disconcertingly many parallels to 
Vietnam. Once again, military might and superior technology cannot 
suppress an insurrection. Once again, losses of own soldiers and the 
overuse of force against locals and even atrocities (My Lai, Abu Ghraib) 
delegitimizes the war and the president, and casts a shadow over the 
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country itself. Once again, the costs of the war drive a budget deficit which 
threatens the international economic system. Once again, doubts and 
protests over the war are on the rise in universities, in the press, and in 
Congress, while domestic support for the war wanes. 
 
Are we facing a rerun of the 1970s? If the US leaves Iraq in circumstances 
similar to how it left Vietnam, it might very well find itself as it did in the 
mid- and late 1970s: self-doubting, inward-looking, and unwilling to use 
force in support of policy. Abroad, the US will not be well seen by many. It 
will be neither liked nor respected. This would be bad news for America’s 
friends and for those that rely on the US for protection and for upholding 
the international system. It would, however, be good news for the West’s 
enemies, which would feel triumphant. When the cat is licking its wounds, 
the rats come out to feast. After the fall of Saigon, the West’s enemies 
moved forward on a lot of fronts: Angola, Iran, Afghanistan, SS-20. But 
which of the West’s adversaries or enemies might do what if Iraq goes as 
Vietnam? This we cannot know. A Jihadist surge? A Russian bid to extend 
its power over former subjects? A Chinese decision that this would be the 
right time to finally settle the matter of Taiwan…..? 
 
To add an even worse and more urgent prospect, Bush may decide to strike 
at the Iranian nuclear programme before his time in the White House is up. 
There are quite a few in the Bush administration who are convinced that 
Iran’s president Ahmadineyad is a new Hitler, bent on the destruction of 
Israel, and that he must not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Some also 
claim that such a strike would be easy to execute, Richard Perle reportedly 
said that it could be done in one night by a few B-2s. One might hope that 
the Israeli Air Force’s difficulties in silencing Hezbollah’s rockets in 
Lebanon last summer have shown the limits of airpower, and sobered some 
minds. But the psychology of the gambler – ‘I have lost so much, I must 
play more to win it back’ – might cause Bush to overrule his generals. As 
things are not going well in Iraq, there would be the temptation to ‘flee 
forward’ by expanding the conflict to Iran. You might recall that Nixon did 
this with Laos and Cambodia.  
 
But the results of a strike on Iran would be much more dramatic than those 
that followed on the bombing of Laos and Cambodia. Iran would of course 
remove all stops on Iraq, which would go up in full flame. Iran would 
probably attempt to close the straits of Hormuz, and to sow chaos and 
discord – perhaps also fighting – in Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah would fire 
rockets at Israel, which would retaliate, starting a new war. Pro-western 
Arab regimes would be under siege, and some might fall. The traditional 
West would be split, but there would be much condemnation of the US. 
The prices of oil and gas would skyrocket. There would probably also be a 
lot of turbulence concerning interest rates, currency rates, and stock 
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markets. And Putin would laugh all the way to the bank, politically as well 
as economically. 
 
----- 
 
These are not rosy prospects, and the reader may find my message overly 
alarmist. I hope that I am wrong on these matters, but I fear that we are in 
for a bumpy ride. While some or even most of the demons I have painted 
on the wall may fail to appear, it seems prudent to consider how they might 
affect us and what we could do, if they materialize. We should perhaps also 
give a thought to which implications these perspectives have for our 
respective security policies, and for the tasks and resources given to our 
armed forces. 
 
Robert Dalsjö is working as a senior analyst at the Swedish Defence 
Research Agency (FOI). He is also currently a leader of a project on 
international operations for the Swedish Ministry of Defence.  
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New Demands for Armed Forces - Expectations to Military 
from Civilian Crisis Management 
Anu Laamanen 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
 
 
The changed nature of conflicts has created a new environment for conflict 
prevention. Lasting peace is to be built on factors like democracy, good 
governance, human rights and a sustainable economy. As a consequence, a 
true challenge for crisis management actors is to develop new crisis 
management methods. There is a clear need to further develop efficient 
civilian crisis management capabilities as a complementary element to 
military means, and vice-versa. As the two have both their own field of 
competence, the challenge is to create sufficient synergy between them and 
thus bring added value to crisis management.  
 
The European Union is a unique actor with efficient tools for civilian and 
military crisis management. The Union has set itself an ambitious goal to 
further strengthen its capabilities in both fields. Particularly, the numerous 
ongoing EU civilian crisis management operations around the world 
symbolise the political will of member states to make the EU a global actor 
in crisis management.  
 
First of all, to fully support a comprehensive approach in crisis 
management, the EU has to be able to define clear priorities for its action. 
The EU has set strategic goals for a comprehensive approach in the 
European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, outlining threats such as state 
failure, organised crime, terrorism, regional conflicts and the weapons of 
mass destruction. Giving an efficient response to threats like these is not 
achievable without interaction between civil and military actors. This is 
clearly the field where the EU leads the way. We also cannot downplay the 
significance of international cooperation. The United Nations and other 
organisations have a major role in conducting operations where attention is 
paid to not only direct military crisis management challenges but also 
rebuilding different aspects of society. 
 
The interaction between civil and military tools has been more and more 
visible in recent crisis management operations. But we still need to seek 
more coherence and also put it in practise. Today there are few crisis areas 
where the parallel work of civil and military components would not be a 
necessity, and the tendency is clearly toward more integrated operations. 
Let us take a look at a few examples of the action the EU has taken with 
regard to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Western Balkans and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  
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Although the union is not active in crisis management inside Iraq, the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 from 2003, article 16, 
invites UN member states and international organisations to contribute to 
the training of Iraqi police and security forces. Following this, the EU 
started a comprehensive training operation called EUJUST LEX in 2005 
for Iraqi Rule of Law officials, judges, the police and penitentiary officials, 
to be conducted outside Iraq. It has successfully trained several hundred 
participants in EU member states. 
 
In Afghanistan the EU has launched a civilian crisis management operation 
in the field of Rule of Law especially assisting and mentoring Afghan 
police forces. Within ISAF and its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) 
we have successfully combined military and civilian action in reforming 
the Afghan security sector. The EU police mission EUPOL is planned to be 
supported by logistics and other expertise of the PRTs. Obviously, 
hazardous conditions in a crisis management environment such as 
Afghanistan require seamless cooperation.  
 
In Kosovo, the status solution and the establishment of international 
presence is still pending a UN Security Council resolution. Selected tasks 
of the UNMIK will be transferred to the EU in the form of an EU civilian 
crisis management operation in the field of Rule of Law. Effective 
mechanisms of cooperation must be found between all actors on the ground 
to find ways to support the creation of sustainable local ownership of all 
Kosovar institutions. 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU has an autonomous military crisis 
management operation, EUFOR Althea, supported by NATO. The EU is 
also conducting a police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUPM. 
Coordinated action has been needed, in particularly in the fight against 
organised crime. Gradually, military crisis management tasks have been 
transferred to civilian authorities. 
 
The need for a comprehensive approach and interaction between civilian 
and military crisis management tools is perfectly illustrated by the concept 
of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). A good example has been the case of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
 
In 2006 during the DRC elections, the EU supported the UN by a military 
operation and by a strengthened police operation. In the field of security 
sector reform, the EU is currently conducting two SSR operations in the 
DRC: EUPOL Congo and EUSEC Congo. Along these operations, support 
is given to Congolese authorities in the reform of police, the judiciary and 
the army. As a long term objective in DRC, there is a need for a more 
comprehensive EU approach in the field of SSR which alongside ESDP 
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operations takes into account individual efforts of member states and the 
activities of the Commission. Again, we also have to pay attention to 
coordination between other international actors in the field of SSR. 
 
Let me now turn to the future. In future crisis management, there is no 
simple sequencing of military first and civilians later. The EU has made 
efforts to further develop a comprehensive approach to crises on both 
conceptual and practical levels: as an example, Security Sector Reform 
(SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), the 
mainstreaming of human rights' aspects in crisis management and so on. 
There are already effective approaches in the field by different crisis 
management actors: Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC), Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT), Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). 
 
In the future, there is a certain need to be able to give an early and rapid 
response to crises, without forgetting effective means of reconstruction. 
First of all, a comprehensive approach to crisis requires practical 
application, like tools for sufficient information exchange. The demands for 
interaction will most obviously come from the field. But this should also be 
reflected in the structures. Some streamlining is still welcome, respecting 
the different mandates, tasks and command structures of civilian and 
military actors.  
 
Finally, there is always a need for a stable financial basis in crisis 
management. The EU is an institution being composed of three pillars, as it 
stands in the Union Treaty. Along with the provisions given by the pillars, 
there are fundamental financial challenges for being able to find a truly 
comprehensive approach to crisis management. The amount the CFSP 
budget allocates for civilian crisis management operations is relatively 
small compared to assets available for military operations. Here, we could 
maybe raise the question of how we could create more synergies or even 
new mechanisms also from this point of view.  
 
In conclusion, in the changing environment of action in crises, there is no 
going back to separate action by the military or the civilians. The pace of 
development has been very rapid and the results of combined action have 
been instantly visible. This is the future of crisis management and it 
requires a full commitment by all crisis management actors of the 
international community. 
 
Anu Laamanen is the director of the Unit for Civilian Crisis Management,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.
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Military Contribution to Crisis Management 
Rear admiral Jørgen Berggrav  
Norwegian Ministry of Defence1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Most nations’ defence structures have been dramatically changed during 
the last decades. During the Cold War, the Norwegian armed forces were 
tailored to meet a large invasion force, focusing on holding terrain and vital 
areas until the country could be reinforces by its NATO allies. The result 
was a large, but not very sophisticated, army, based on mobilisation. The 
air force was small (approximately 70 fighter planes) and mainly equipped 
for air defence. In order to ensure quick effect of the ear marked allied 
fighter squadrons, the infrastructure of the air force could support some 400 
aircraft. The navy focused on protection of the vital sea lines of 
communication, as well as anti-invasion.  
 
In short, it could be said that the tailoring of the structure was quite 
effective for the purpose it was created for, but not for very much else.  
 
This has changed dramatically. The downsizing of the forces has turned the 
no longer needed volume into a much more flexible, capable and 
deployable capacity, making a much more relevant instrument of today’s 
security policy. And because modern forces with higher readiness are more 
capable of meeting the unexpected, they are also generally better 
contributors to complex crisis management than the old structure. 
 
 
National Priorities 
 
For any country, the design of its armed forces must be rooted in national 
priorities. For Norway, there are two driving factors. The first is to 
contribute to common security with our allies and partners by sharing risks 
and burdens in international operations, requiring enhanced deployability 
and interoperability, concerning weapons and systems as well as the 
professional standard of our personnel. The second factor is homeland 
security, with a specific focus on the situation in the high North. 
Approximately 25% of the world’s oil reserves are located in the Arctic, 
and some of this is located on the Norwegian continental shelf or close to 
it. The same area is also one of the most important fishing grounds in 
Europe. These strategically important resources are one of the reasons why 
                                            
1 This article reflects the author’s own views and does not represent official views of 
Norwegian political authorities. 
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Norway and Russia have not reached an agreement on a maritime border in 
this area. The climate change may increase the strategic value even more, 
as the ice melts and opens new areas for navigation and oil exploration. 
The extreme weather conditions created by the climate change may create 
increased environmental vulnerability. 
 
The fact that Russia still has large forces based the neighbouring Kola 
Peninsula, does not by itself pose any threat to Norway. However, in a 
different political situation, we cannot exclude the possibility that Norway 
may be exposed to overt or covert military force from someone who wants 
to achieve political or economic objectives. Consequently, Norway must 
apply a policy of cooperation with the other “actors” in the area. Russia is 
especially important in this context. The relation between the two countries 
is very good, as is the relation between their armed forces. But Norway 
must also maintain a credible military crisis management capacity. This 
capacity should be able to deal with small and medium crisis, but more 
importantly, should a crisis be to much for Norway on her own, we must be 
able to force an opponent to bear the burden of escalation and face the 
consequences of that the conflict might not only be limited to a bilateral 
issue. To enhance allied backing in the north, it is important to be perceived 
as credible and relevant contributor to common security. The focus on 
international operations and the security of the High North are therefore 
two sides of the same coin. 
 
 
Planning for the Unexpected 
 
The complexity of to-day’s security challenges must be incorporated in the 
planning and design of the armed forces. Therefore, a few but important 
contingencies can no longer alone dimension the structure. Instead, a wide 
span of scenarios must be used to check out the flexibility and the 
capability of the structure. In selecting scenarios, attention should be paid 
to include scenarios in the cross-over areas between areas of responsibility 
of other ministries. In the wargaming process, a comprehensive approach 
must be taking, including no-military expertise when possible.  
 
The recent Norwegian defence reviews have clearly shown that high 
quality units, available to the operational commander on short notice, 
outweigh traditional and more numerous forces based on mobilisation.  
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Crisis, Conflict or Catastrophe? 
 
The capability to meet military aggression is clearly the raison d’etre of 
armed forces. In the new security situation, this is not likely to be a “black 
or white” definition, and armed forces should not be limited only to 
security political crisis. If an “intelligent opponent” plays an active part in a 
crisis, the responsibility to deal with the conflict lays normally either with 
the ministry of defence or with ministry of justice (interior), if there is no 
opponent, another ministry will be responsible for tackling the catastrophe. 
But a catastrophe might develop into a conflict, or a conflict could turn into 
a catastrophe. The cross-over potential is plentiful. In my view, it is hard to 
imagine armed forces as the only tool to manage any crisis. More likely, 
armed forces must be used as a finely tuned instrument together with other 
governmental and non-governmental organisations in a comprehensive 
approach. 
 
 
The Military Contribution 
 
The most obvious contribution from the military would of course be the use 
of force against an “official” (state) aggressor, but the responsibility of 
using force in a terrorist attack on national territory normally rests with the 
police. However, the nature of asymmetric conflicts tends to blur this 
division. In order to avoid overlapping structures and waste of resources, 
the armed forces should be prepared to support the police and other 
authorities, commanded by the civilian authorities if required. This would 
improve the sustainability considerably, allowing the police to focus on the 
extremely important every day work in countering these threats. 
 
This requires a legal platform, and synchronisation of structural planning to 
avoid overlap and especially to avoid shortfall in the crossover areas. This 
will without doubt reveal conflict of interests and in particular the “fight for 
budgets”, but must nevertheless be done. 
 
Military units are not only designed to fight, but to deploy and sustain 
operations out of their normal base area. They are equipped with 
deployable high quality communication and have unique transport 
capability on land, including off-road, air and sea. The ability to establish 
camps and medical facilities in an emergency area will also be vital in a 
crisis situation.  
 
The interaction between armed forces and other crisis management 
contributors can not be based on contingency plans alone. The 
unpredictability of a major crisis requires flexible plans and to a great 
extent self-synchronisation by the actors themselves. This may be 
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compared to network-centric approach to military operations. This is only 
possible by sharing information. To make this doable, the roles and 
particularities of different “players” must be mutually respected, and a 
common crisis management information system must be made available to 
everybody. The system used in the Barents rescue 2005, consisting of a 
self-explanatory message handling and situation display system based on 
the internet, is a good example. The system could be made available to 
“anybody” by allocating username and passwords. 
Mutual understanding of roles, procedures and respect is a prerequisite for 
net-working. Consequently, the crossover areas should be exercised 
frequently, both by synchronising exercises within the different areas of 
responsibility, but also on the local and regional level. 
 
 
Complicating Issues 
 
The tightly knitted civilian – military operations is not without 
complications. Non-governmental organisations will often prefer to act 
independently and normally take care not to be associated with military 
operations. This is a question of principle as well as to ensure “neutrality”. 
This may be particularly important in international crisis management. 
 
The traditional approach to use of military force as defence against external 
aggression, contradicts the use of military assets “against” the nations own 
citizens. Historical examples of military or paramilitary forces not only in 
countries with a military “junta” leadership, but also in the Nordic 
countries in the 1930-ies have shown that care must be taken. However, it 
is vital that fear of the uncertainties of the cross-over area between police 
matters and military must not leave areas without leadership, leaving 
vulnerable spots. Such weak spots will not only be hard to manage in a 
crisis, but even worse, they may be exploited by an “intelligent” opponent 
in a conflict-crisis scenario. There is no “facit” to this problem, but 
hopefully it can be reduced by openly discussing the issue, establish 
routines and procedures and frequent exercises. 
 
One should be careful not to view military forces as a universal remedy for 
resolving crisis. Military units are, and should be designed and trained to 
deal with (and survive) high intensity warfare situations. To maintain large 
volume military forces as “nice to have” in crisis situations is neither 
practical nor economical wise. The volume, counted by “body weight” can 
be produce much more efficiently as a civilian force. The military must be 
measured by their quality, using the capabilities built in by their primary 
function. 
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Avoiding the Shortfalls of Stove-pipe Thinking 
 
The un-predictable cross-over areas in complex crises is a major challenge 
in itself. Most countries have organised the assets likely to be used in crisis 
management under different ministries and agencies, and resources, 
training and loyalty follows the “chain of command”. This may have 
negative consequences that should be compensated for.   
 
A crisis is likely to cover the areas of responsibility of several ministries 
and organisations, probably with varying intensity and focus from the 
actors. At a certain stage, the main focus could be on stabilizing a security 
challenge by use of force from police and/or military units, in another stage 
on search and rescue, environment and so on. It is hard to imagine that it 
will be possible to identify one ministry or organisation as the natural 
“owner” of the crisis for the entire duration. To change the “ownership” 
(once or more) during the crisis, is likely to result in reduced effect in the 
handover period. But the activities of all the contributors, such as police, 
health care assets, environmental protection units, search and rescue assets, 
armed forces, transportation units and not to forget several non-
governmental organisations, must be coordinated and synchronised during 
the entire crisis. If not, they will be less effective and perhaps sometimes 
counter-productive if the activities are at least not deconflicted. This calls 
for a pre-designated command and control facility, capable of providing the 
person in charge with multi-sector situation awareness and sufficient 
communication capacity, as well as having a robust organisation with 
experienced operators.  
 
The command and control facility should not be “sleeping”, but ready for 
action. It should be running 24/7 and operate and command units on a 
regular basis. A military headquarters is also one of the few facilities able 
to deal with all kinds of sensitive information. This is a very similar task to 
command a military operation. Instead of reproducing the command and 
control facilities normally inherent in a joint military headquarters, it is my 
personal view that the military HQ should be adjusted to this role. 
Facilitating the possibility of a civilian “commander”, as well as creating 
working spaces for other agencies, should be a part of this adjustment. 
 
 
Defining the Crisis 
 
The ability to maintain cross sector situation awareness in one joint 
headquarters, will also assist in defining a crisis situation, i.e., when the 
situation deviates from normal. If the situation is only monitored be each 
sector separately, the situation might not appear as seriously as if several 
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sectors are viewed comprehensively. This is important, as rapid reaction is 
vital to contain any crisis or catastrophe.  
 
 
Leadership 
 
Managing an unknown crisis requires the ability to walk unknown paths, 
and the courage to cross defined borders of responsibility when necessary. 
The leader must be willing to short circuit the bureaucracy if needed. 
Sometimes he must take command of relevant resources outside of his 
normal reach, but be open-minded and willing to place the resources at the 
disposal of the appropriate authority when the situations normalises.  
 
The leader who “plays safe” within his own area of authority is, as I see it, 
not likely to succeed. The leader in any crisis situation must be prepared to 
face criticism in order to reach the objectives of the operation. This calls 
for courageous leaders, exercising leadership, and not for managers and 
administrators. This might require other persons than the modern business-
administrative executives often found in modern societies. Potential crisis 
management leaders should be well prepared for their responsibilities, 
focusing on crisis management, exercising a variety of scenarios, and 
“dreaming about crisis management by night”. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
After the cold war, the security challenges to modern societies constitute no 
longer a clear black-and-white picture, with well-defined friends and foes, 
represented by states only. Now, the picture has changed to look more that 
of a modernistic colourful painting. In facing crisis situations, domestically 
or internationally, the national resources must be applied in a 
comprehensive approach. 
 
Modern armed forces are valuable contributors in managing sector over-
arching crisis. Military personnel are operationally focused and have in 
addition to the ability to use force, transportation assets, deployable 
medical facilities and command, control and communication capabilities. 
To ensure the best possible result of the comprehensive approach, it is vital 
that sector over-arching crisis management is exercised frequently. This is 
not only the best way of testing out equipment and procedures, but 
absolutely vital to create respect and trust between different contributors in 
crisis management operations. This is vital to exploit the possibilities of a 
network centric approach, which in my mind clearly is the most effective in 
complicated situations. 
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Any situation characterised by “the fog of war (crisis)” require strong 
leadership and courage to short-circuit the bureaucracy when need. Both 
civilian and military leaders should be selected and trained to face such 
challenges.  
 
Rear admiral Jørgen Berggrav is Director General of the Defence Policy 
and Long Term Planning Department at the Royal Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence. 
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Soldiers as State-Builders: The Danish Experience1 
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen 
Danish Institute for International Studies 
 
 
Military Intervention and State-building: Competing for Local Hearts 
and Minds 
 
Economic reconstruction and institution building have long been 
recognised as key ingredients in sustainable conflict resolution. Yet, within 
the broader context of the US-led “war on terrorism”, stable and 
functioning states, which are believed less likely to deliver recruits to the 
al-Qaeda movement or lend their territories to training activities, are now 
perceived as a key security interest for Western countries.2 Despite 
differences in mandate, participants, international legitimacy, level of 
ambition and so on, both Iraq and Afghanistan (and Kosovo) are state-
building missions aiming at stable, democratic, moderately religious states 
living in peace with their surroundings.3  
 
In state-building missions, success hinges on whether local populations 
eventually turn their expectations and ultimately their loyalty towards the 
new democratic political structures, instead of towards sectarian militias, 
insurgent movements, or local warlords. Thus, the hearts and minds of 
local populations become the mission’s “centre of gravity.” There is a 
scarcity of empirically based knowledge about what it requires to win and 
hold on to local hearts and minds in today’s conflict and post-conflict 
mission areas.4 Most analyses refer either to common sense, or rely on 
historical analogy. British counter-insurgency experience from the 20th
 
century, for example, indicates that winning hearts and minds, where these 
are fiercely contested, depends on providing security from, but also 
political and economic alternatives to, sectarian militias, insurgent 
                                                 
1 This article is an extract from the study report: Soldiers and state-building: The 
approach of the Danish armed forces to reconstruction support by Anja Dalgaard-
Nielsen. Published in DIIS REPORT 2007:2. The research is based amongst others on 
“embedded research” with Danish units in the field.  
2 Chau, Donovan C. 2006. Political Warfare – An Essential Instrument of U.S. Grand 
Strategy. Comparative Strategy vol 25: 109. For a critical appraisal see Menkhaus, Ken. 
2003. The Security Paradox of Failed States. National Strategy Forum Review vol. 12, 
3: p. 3. 
3 As outlined in the following UN Security Council Resolutions: Regarding Iraq: 
S/RES/ 1483: 1, S/RES/1546: 3, S/RES/1483: 1. Regarding Kosovo: S/RES/1244: 3. 
Regarding Afghanistan: A/RES/56/200: 2, S/2001/1154: 2. Available on 
http://www.un.org/documents/ (accessed on January 23, 2007). 
4 For a discussion of old and new challenges in today’s counterinsurgency operations 
see Mackinlay, John. 2005. Defeating Complex Insurgency. Beyond Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Whitehall Paper 64. London: United Royal Services Institute. 
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movements, criminal networks, and local warlords. Moreover, effective 
military stabilisation, in itself, requires a reconstruction effort. Militias, 
insurgent movements, and criminal networks will always be able to find 
new recruits unless political and economic alternatives are provided.5 
 
One of the few interview-based studies, mapping the expectations and 
perceptions of local communities in conflict areas, support these notions. 
The results indicate that local populations frequently meet an intervening 
force with friendly or neutral attitudes. Perceptions then develop based on 
two major issues – negative peace in the sense of an absence of direct 
fighting, and positive peace, comprising reconstruction, jobs, and 
improvements in daily life.6 Negative peace is important. However, it 
seems the attention of local populations shifts towards positive peace very 
quickly after the end of major fighting operations.  
 
In summary, security is a necessary but insufficient precondition for 
winning hearts and minds. It has to be combined with a quick and visible 
effort to improve daily life and political opportunities in the conflict zone 
to reduce the pull of criminal networks and insurgent groups. In other 
words, security, democratic governance and economic development are 
interconnected and must be pursued simultaneously, not sequentially.7 
However, as dramatically highlighted by the bombing in August 2003 of 
the UN headquarter in Baghdad, civilian organisations and agencies have 
increasingly become direct targets in conflict areas around the world. In 
Iraq and parts of Afghanistan, security reasons have forced a withdrawal of 
                                                 
5 Celeski, Joseph D. 2005. Operationalizing COIN. JSOU Report 05-2. Hurlburt Field, 
Florida: Joint Special Operations University; Cordesman, Anthony H. 2006. The 
Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq. 
Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies; White House. 2005. 
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Washington D.C.: White House; Eide, Espen 
Barth, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karin von Hippel. 2005. Report on 
Integrated Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study 
for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group; Metz, Steven, Raymond Millen. 2004. 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st
 
Century: Reconceptionalizing Threat and 
Response. Strategic Studies Institute; Mockatitis, Thomas R. 1995. British 
counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era. Manchester: Manchester University Press: p. 
146.  
6 Donini, Antonio, Larry Minear, Ian Millie, Ted van Baarda, Anthony C. Welch. 2005. 
Mapping the Security Environment. Understanding the perceptions of local 
communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies. Medford MA: 
Feinstein International Famine Center: 61. 
7 Further emphasising the need to seize the initiative and act quickly is the fact that 
spoilers such as insurgents and militias are likely to be unorganised in the immediate 
wake of a military intervention. Dobbins, James. 2006. Preparing for Nation-Building. 
Survival vol 48, no. 3: 38; Mackinlay, John. 2005. Defeating Complex Insurgency. 
Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Whitehall Paper 64. London: United Royal Services 
Institute.  
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civilian agencies from large areas. To fill the resulting gap, western policy-
makers have turned to the armed forces.8 
 
Currently, US, British, French, and Danish doctrines and directives all 
acknowledge that under certain circumstances, soldiers might have to 
provide humanitarian aid, secure law and order, engage in reconstruction, 
and/or substitute for the civilian administration of a failed state. Military 
training centres and units focussing on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
have sprung up in a number of Western countries. Reconstruction support 
units and civil advisers are now part of the force contributions of a number 
of countries in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the surface, the armed forces seem 
to have made a substantial effort to integrate various aspects of state-
building, in particular reconstruction support, with military efforts.9 
 
Some scholars, however, have suggested that this effort is more symbolic 
than real. Political pressure, they argue, have forced an adjustment in 
doctrines and directives, but in reality the armed forces continue to give 
priority to more traditional and directly security related tasks. They point 
out how the easy victory in the first Gulf War in 1991 confirmed Western 
militaries in their Cold War focus on major conventional battles, that is, on 
the operational level of war, reinforcing a disregard of the counter-
insurgency lessons of the European de-colonisation wars and the US 
                                                 
8 For attacks on civilian organisations, see Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, 
Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina. 2005. The UN´s 
Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq. Santa Monica: RAND: 189 and 199; 
Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq. 
2003. 20 October; Donini, Antonio, Larry Minear, Ian Millie, Ted van Baarda, Anthony 
C. Welch. 2005. Mapping the Security Environment. Understanding the perceptions of 
local communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies. Medford MA: 
Feinstein International Famine Center: 15; Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact. 
Bi-Annual JCMB Report. 2006. Kabul, 12 November: 2; Author’s interviews, Basra 
Palace, April 2006. For political pressure, see Veicherts, Nicolas T. 2005. Hvorfor 
samtænkning af militær og civil indsats er kommet for at blive. DIIS Brief. 
Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; Veicherts, Nicolas T. 2005. 
Hvorfor samtænkning af militær og civil indsats er nødvendig i felten. DIIS Brief. 
Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; Veicherts, Nicolas T. 2006. 
Samtænkninng – modstand og muligheder. DIIS Report 2006:5.Brief. Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute for International Studies. See also Zaalberg, Thijs W. Brocades. 2006. 
Soldiers and Civil Power. Supporting or Substituting Civil Institutions in Modern Peace 
Operations. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
9 Ministry of Defence. 2006. The Comprehensive Approach. Joint Discussion Note 
4/05. UK: Swindon: 1-5 and 3-4; Ministry of Defence. 2006. Joint Doctrine Publication 
3-90. Civil-Military Co-Operation. UK: Swindon: 1-2. The German doctrine is more 
timid and only endorses the occasional need for soldiers to take on humanitarian tasks, 
not law and order or institution-building tasks. Ministry of Defence. 2003. Defence 
Policy Guidelines. Germany: Berlin. The French doctrine places particular emphasis on 
building the capacity of local actors to reassert control. Ministry of Defence. 2005. The 
French armed forces and Civil-Military Cooperation: 5.  
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experience in Vietnam. Moreover, it is claimed, the perceived failure of the 
UN mission UNOSOM II in Somalia and the drawn-out engagements in 
ex-Yugoslavia, on the other hand, presumably led particularly the US 
military to pull back from “nation-building” to focus on more narrowly 
defined military tasks.10 
 
In summary, within the broader context of the US-led “war on terrorism”, 
military interventions increasingly aim at building stable and functioning 
states. Civilian tasks like reconstruction and institution building are crucial 
in progressing towards this end-state and, to some extent, hinge on the 
armed forces. The need to facilitate or directly engage in these tasks now 
figure more or less explicitly in military directives and doctrines on both 
sides of the Atlantic, including in Denmark, as explained below.  
 
 
Denmark: the Coordinated Planning and Action Initiative 
 
The Concerted Planning and Action initiative (CPA) was launched in a 
common document from the Danish Ministry of Defence and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 2004. While the document offers no clear-cut definition 
of CPA, the key notion is clear: if Danish military and development efforts 
in a crisis area are coordinated, resources can be mobilised faster, and 
synergies will result. This will accelerate military stabilisation and the 
establishment of a functioning state.11 It is underlined that humanitarian 
and reconstruction tasks do not belong to the core task and core 
competencies of the armed forces and should normally be carried out by 
civilian relief organisations. However, if the security situation precludes 
civilian actors from operating, the document states, the armed forces should 
step in to support and facilitate reconstruction work.12 
                                                 
10 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2006. Germany, pacifism and peace-enforcement. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 105-107; Dobbins, James. 2006. 
Preparing for Nation-Building. Survival vol 48, no. 3: 28; Nash, Bill, John Hillen. 
Debate: Can soldiers be peacekeepers and warriors. 2001. NATO Review; Gordon, 
Stuart. 2006. The changing role of the military in assistance strategies. In Resetting the 
rules of engagement. Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations, eds. Victoria 
Wheeler and Adele Harmer. HPG Research Report 21.London, p. 40; Strachan, Hew. 
2006. Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq. Survival, vol. 48, no. 3: 60. 
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. Samtænkning af civil og 
militær indsats i internationale operationer, annex to Defence Agreement 2005-2009; 
Speech by Minister of Defence Søren Gade. 2005. Concerted Planning and Action of 
Civil and Military Activities in International Operations. NATO Seminar on CPA. 
Copenhagen, June 20. 
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. Samtænkning af civil og 
militær indsats i internationale operationer, annex to Defence Agreement 2005-2009. 
Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence; Forsvarskommandoen. 2005. Forsvarets civilt-
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According to guidelines issued by the two ministries, CPA projects are 
intended to meet elementary humanitarian needs, assist vulnerable and 
excluded groups, produce visible results in terms of material assistance to 
local populations, assist the (re-)establishment of the local administration, 
and promote the legal security of individuals and groups.13 
 
CPA funds have been funnelled to units in the Basra province, Iraq and in 
the provinces of Badakshan and Helmand, Afghanistan.14 In Afghanistan, 
CIMIC units, in cooperation with a civil adviser employed by the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are responsible for CPA activities. In Iraq a 
special 12-person unit, Reconstruction Unit Denmark (RUD), has been 
established and dedicated to CPA projects. RUD is supervised and assisted 
by a civilian adviser and the CIMIC section of DBG headquarters, and 
consists of a mixture of reserve and line personnel. In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan regular unit provide security to RUD/CIMIC, which typically 
operate in teams of two: one officer and one warrant officer.15 
 
In terms of the immediate physical results, CPA and traditional CIMIC 
projects carried out by the armed forces might differ little. Both focus on 
relatively minor infrastructure improvements, health, water, and education. 
The two types of projects, however, differ in terms of funding, purpose, 
and presumably, longer-term results. CIMIC projects are funded via the 
defence budget, and are undertaken to support the mission, win consent and 
contribute to force protection. They are typically quick impact projects, not 
necessarily focussing on long-term sustainability or local involvement. 
CPA projects, in contrast, are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and are, according to the CPA guidelines, supposed to assist vulnerable 
groups and contribute towards strengthening the local administration. To 
put it simply, when the armed forces do CIMIC projects they do it to help 
themselves. The time perspective is likely to be short. While CIMIC 
                                                                                                                                               
militære samarbejde (CIMIC) og forsvarets relation til “samtænkningsinitiativet” 
FKODIR PL.190-1. 
13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. Retningslinier for militært-
civilt samarbejde ved humanitære og genopbygningsindsatser finansieret af 
Udenrigsministeriet. Denmark: Copenhagen. 
14 The Danish force contribution in Basra consists of a battalion size battle group 
(Danish Battle Group, DBG). 290 soldiers are deployed to the Helmand province and a 
contingent of 41 soldiers form part of a German Provincial Reconstruction Team in 
Badakshan. 
15 The civil adviser has either a technical or a development background, is working from 
within the deployed headquarters, and liaises closely with the CIMIC section, while 
advising the operative units. The Danish Battalion in Iraq also supports a group of civil 
advisers employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Basra Palace Camp – 
the so-called Steering Unit – responsible for longer-term reconstruction projects. RUD 
units support the Steering Unit with some aspects of project identification, data 
collection, and monitoring while regular units support with transportation and security.  
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projects might have a positive impact over the longer term, the immediate 
impact on hearts and minds is the primary aim. CPA projects, in contrast, 
might have a positive and immediate impact on political and social support, 
but local needs, not the needs of the deployed soldiers, should guide the 
selection and implementation of projects.  
 
 
The Approach of the Danish Armed Forces to CPA 
 
Since the launch of CPA, RUD/CIMIC units have facilitated a range of 
health, education, and infrastructure projects. Clean drinking water has 
been provided to remote villages. Schools have been enlarged and 
improved. Health clinics have been build or improved, and minor local 
infrastructure improvements such as bridge constructions or repair have 
been carried out. Four staff officers, a civil adviser, and the 12-member 
RUD unit facilitated 33 such projects in the Basra province in less than a 
year (from mid-2005 to April 2006). Four CIMIC officers, assisted by a 
civil adviser, facilitated 28 projects in the Badakshan province between 
May 2005 and June 2006.16 
 
It is frequently assumed that RUD/CIMIC does the actual reconstruction 
work. This is not the case. Whenever possible, local contractors are hired. 
Moreover, as also frequently assumed, the soldiers do not impose specific 
projects from the outside based on a well-meaning but possibly misguided 
conception of locals need. On the contrary, RUD or CIMIC teams liaise 
with local authorities and community leaders to identify potential projects. 
In practice, local councils (Iraq) or village elders (Afghanistan) are 
requested to draw up a prioritised list of their needs. Based on this list, 
projects are identified. A local entrepreneur is then hired through a 
tendering process, anchored in the local council, but overseen by 
RUD/CIMIC, which also monitors the actual construction work, and is in 
charge of financial management and final approval. The project cycle 
concludes with a formal hand-over to representatives of the local 
councils.17 
                                                 
16 RUD. 2006. RUD projektoversigt uge 15. Iraq: Camp Danevang. Since the launch of 
the initiative in 2003 Danish units in Iraq have facilitated projects of a value of about 13 
mill. DKK. In Afghanistan CPA projects are funded via the overall Danish allocation 
for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. From May 2005 to June 
2006 about 1 mill. DKK were allocated to CPA projects supported by the Danish armed 
forces. For further details see Danida. 2006. Desk Review of Civil-Military Activities in 
Iraq Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Final Report. COWI Consult; 
Danida. 2006. Review of Civil-Military Activities in Afghanistan Financed by the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Final Report. COWI Consult. 
17 The tendering procedure was not used in Badakshan where CIMIC instead relied 
mainly on one trusted local entrepreneur. Whereas this practice was clearly less in line 
with CPA guidelines than the practice followed in Iraq, it might be in part justifiable 
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Challenges Encountered by RUD/CIMIC Units 
 
The Concerted Planning and Action initiative enjoys a high level of 
national political attention. The Danish Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Defence have gone to great lengths to impress the importance and priority 
of the initiative upon the armed forces. Attempts have also been made to 
launch the concept internationally.18 However, as suggested by some 
analysts, there are indications that the armed forces have accepted to 
support civil reconstruction more in name than in reality. Although many 
Danish officers, at least in words, embraced CPA, RUD/CIMIC units 
appeared relatively neglected by the planning and support system as well as 
by some commanders on the ground. RUD/CIMIC work suffered from a 
lack of strategic planning, specialised training and education, proper 
systems for capturing and transmitting lessons learned, and problems 
getting access to resources such as security escorts. 
 
This section discusses the major challenges encountered by RUD/CIMIC 
units and shows how they nevertheless performed well. It uses Edgar H. 
Schein’s19 concept of culture and illustrates how the composite nature of 
the culture of Danish armed forces help make sense of the otherwise 
puzzling combination of low priority/high performance of RUD/CIMIC 
units.  
 
 
Strategic Planning 
 
“Not coordinated and not part of an overall plan.” This is how one RUD 
officer described CPA, looking back at his six-month tour.20 The perceived 
absence of strategic guidance emerged again and again as a source of 
                                                                                                                                               
due to the weakness of local governance structures and the existence of far fewer local 
entrepreneurs. Also with regard to the hand-over, the practice varied between Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Hand over was at times less formal in Afghanistan, where many projects 
were smaller than in Iraq.  
18 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence. 2005. Seminar in 
Copenhagen 20 and 21 June 2005 on concerted planning and action of civil and military 
activities in international operations. Program and Chairmen’s report; Speech by Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Danish Defence Academy, 1. November 2006.  
19 See Edgar H. Schein. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
20 Author’s interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006; Danida. 2006. Desk Review of 
Civil-Military Activities in Iraq Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Final Report. COWI Consult: 34-35. Arguably, this compromised the efforts in a 
number of ways. Even when units for example took care to work through local 
structures, the needs of marginalised groups or groups not favoured by local councils 
and village elders are, of course, not necessarily accommodated by the projects. 
Djurhuus, Johanne. 2006. Hjertesuk fra Basra. Politiken. 15. March. 
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frustration in interviews with RUD/CIMIC officers. Indeed, by mid-2006, 
this author was unable to locate an overall CPA strategy to give direction to 
the efforts of individual RUD/CIMIC teams in terms of needs in their 
specific area, strategic goal, operational goals, and sector focus. The 
deployed civil advisers were praised on a number of accounts, but 
contributed mainly technical advice, project management expertise, cultural 
insights and, in the case of one adviser, political advice. The “higher 
levels” at home (the military commands) were seen as excessively focussed 
on monitoring and managing the micro level of CPA – the number of 
security escorts, the possibility of accommodating civilians in the military 
camps and so on, instead of providing strategic guidance.21 
 
Ideally, CPA, like other aspects of a deployed unit’s efforts, should be 
guided by a strategic plan, spanning more than just one rotation. Such a 
plan would depart from an assessment of the situation and the needs within 
the area of responsibility, and be guided by a clear strategic objective, a 
definition of the overall aim and intended impact of the efforts. Operational 
goals (short-term and medium-term goals) should be derived from the 
strategic goal. Indicators for measuring progress should be explained and 
applied.22 Such a strategy would provide continuity beyond the six-month 
tour of each individual rotation, and guide deployed units as to what 
geographical areas, sectors, and project types to focus on. The main 
responsibility for forging such a strategy would appear to lie with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has the necessary development 
expertise. Whether the failure to provide such a strategy should be ascribed 
to the fact that CPA is still relatively new, to work pressure, or to a lack of 
willingness to wholeheartedly support CPA, is a discussion which is 
beyond the scope of this report.  
 
With the absence of an overall strategy, each new commander and 
RUD/CIMIC team has been largely free to shape the implementation of 
CPA on the ground. In principle, sector focus, priorities, and operational 
success criteria may thus change every six months, compromising the 
coherence and overall impact of the effort.23 
 
                                                 
21 Author’s interviews, Camp Danevang, Basra Palace, and PRT Feyzabad, April, May, 
and June 2006. 
22 Baylis, John, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin S. Gray. 2002. Strategy in the 
Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 4; Nastsios, Andrew W. 2005. The nine principles of reconstruction and 
development. Parameters, autumn: 10.  
23 Whereas some commander for example evaluated success in terms of the number of 
projects others have measured it in terms of the number of security escorts carried out 
for RUD or civil actors affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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In this respect, Denmark differs little from allied nations. The British 
Brigade, responsible for the southern part of Iraq, including the Danish area 
of responsibility, apparently attempted to provide some coherence to the 
work of the different national CIMIC contingents by directing projects 
towards specific sectors: electricity, health, or water. However, priorities 
tended to shift as brigades rotated in and out. Obviously, the fact that 
Danish units always and inevitably form part of larger coalitions demands 
that an effective contextual CPA strategy has to take the coalition element 
into account. Effective solutions to the lack of coherence ultimately have to 
be sought at NATO or coalition level. Meanwhile, however, an applied 
national CPA strategy would increase the effectiveness of Danish efforts, 
and as well as making easier the international sale of the CPA idea.  
 
 
Assignment, Training, and Specialisation 
 
The vast majority of the RUD/CIMIC personnel interviewed for this study 
had no prior experience with project work or civil-military liaison. Only 
half-jokingly, many characterised their assignment as guided by the 
“halløjsa” principle – roughly translated, the hit-and-miss principle. Rarely 
did previous experience and expertise point towards a RUD/CIMIC job.24 
Short and intense training is intended to brief the personnel assigned prior 
to deployment. Staff and officers assigned CPA tasks receive two weeks of 
specialised CIMIC/CPA training in Denmark and the Netherlands, 
focussing on context, concepts, and challenges, and how to carry out 
liaison and project work. Operative units cover many similar aspects, but 
with a more hands-on focus, using case-studies and practical exercises.  
 
The assessment of whether this training provided proper preparation was 
mixed. Some officers felt hampered by a lack of local knowledge. Others 
emphasised how many of the skills conveyed in the general Danish 
officers’ training: communication and contact skills, were useful, and 
generally felt well-prepared for the job.25 This author attended part of the 
pre-deployment training of both staff and operative RUD/CIMIC units. 
Even if parts were rushed, not permitting in-depth exploration, case studies 
and scenarios were used effectively and appeared to prepare the assigned 
units reasonably well to address the challenges of project work in the 
deployment areas. 
 
                                                 
24 Author’s interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, Camp Novo Selo, March 
2006, Camp Olaf Rye, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May 2006. 
25 Author’s interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, Camp Novo Selo and 
Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006; Camp Danevang, April 2006; PRT Feyzabad, May 2006. 
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However, accentuating the challenge of quickly conveying new skills to 
personnel with no prior experience, trainers had difficulty getting personnel 
appointed in time for the start of the training course. Also, getting access to 
the necessary equipment apparently posed problems.26 Moreover, although 
the project management aspects of CPA were covered reasonably well 
during the training, the personnel assigned were insufficiently prepared for 
the capacity building aspect of CPA – the requirement that CPA should aid 
in the (re-) establishment of a local administration. These aspects were not 
covered in pre-deployment training. Again, the assessment of the officers 
and soldiers themselves was mixed. Whereas some members of 
RUD/CIMIC claimed that common sense and even the most basic 
knowledge of local Danish democratic structures went a long way, others 
noted that young Danish officers did not have the knowledge and authority 
to coach Iraqi council members in the procedural and democratic aspects of 
their work. As was the case for CPA as such, many were critical of what 
they saw as the absence of a strategy and clear operational goals for 
capacity building. A common sentiment was that “we have been told to 
build capacity, but not how to do it.” Again, the author is not aware of the 
existence of strategic CPA guidance on this aspect.27 
 
In contrast to the Danish system, countries like France and Germany 
established specialised and standing CIMIC units as the perceived 
importance of CIMIC grew over the 1990s. France has a CIMIC Company 
in Lyon, and Germany has a (battalion-sized) CIMIC unit in Nienburg 
(CIMIC Centrum Nienburg). These units are partly operational, partly 
training and education centres, responsible for pre-deployment training of 
tactical-level CIMIC personnel. Staff assigned to the French or German 
centre typically serves three to four years in these units. Although not all 
deployed CIMIC personnel are drawn from these units, some are and these 
bring a significant experience to the job.28 
 
The Danish CIMIC unit does not comprise any standing operative units. 
With only a few full-time staff, it is fully occupied with education and 
training. An expansion of this unit has been resisted with arguments such as 
“Denmark is too small for this kind of specialisation” and “any good 
officer of the line can do CIMIC.” The Danish culture of dialogue, the 
communicative and interpersonal skills of Danish officers, the argument 
goes, permits them to engage in CIMIC tasks without additional training.29 
                                                 
26 Author’s interviews and observations, Oksboel and Garrison of Hoevelte, January and 
February 2006. 
27 Author’s interview, Camp Danevang, April 2006. 
28 Author’s interviews, Camp Novo Selo, March 2006; Field Camp Prizren, March 
2006. 
29 Author’s interview, Camp Olaf Rye and KFOR Headquarters, March 2006; PRT 
Feyzabad, May 2006. 
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Whereas the latter might well be true, it is also the case that the German 
CIMIC units joined by the researcher displayed superior communication, 
negotiation, and psychological skills vis-à-vis local leaders and locally 
hired entrepreneurs. Experience arguably makes a difference.30 
 
 
Capturing and Transmitting Lessons Learned  
 
As a rule, Danish soldiers serve a six-month tour in international missions, 
and the entire contingent in any given deployment area is thus replaced 
every six-months. As mentioned, civil advisers span more than one rotation 
and thus provide for some continuity. Moreover, members of previous 
RUD/CIMIC teams are involved in the pre-deployment training of new 
teams, which also overlap with their predecessors in the field for two to six 
days. This transfer period, however, is described as extremely hectic and 
very short for transferring knowledge, contacts, and concrete projects.31 
 
Civilian development professionals with a time perspective of more than 
one military rotation emphasised how many lessons apparently had to be 
relearned because they were lost between rotations. At the same time, 
however, members of RUD/CIMIC described how reporting back to the 
Army Operational Command in Denmark was extremely time-consuming 
and detail-oriented. The reporting requirement is one more illustration of 
how strategic issues are lost sight of amid details and short-term practical 
issues.32 Acting on frustration due to a perceived lack of overview of past 
and present CPA activities, members of an RUD unit deployed to Iraq in 
autumn 2005 took the initiative to establish a database, recording practical 
and technical information about the sponsored projects.33 
 
                                                 
30 Author’s observations, Kosovo, March 2006 and Afghanistan, May 2006. See list of 
patrols and meetings attended at the end of this document. Danish CIMIC/RUD units 
are in other ways better supported than German units – German units typically lack 
funding for anything beyond very small quick impact projects and need to apply for 
funds with potential donors at home every time a potential project has been identified. 
31 An inherent challenge is that effective liaison and project work to a large extent build 
on trust between local actors and the soldiers. Trust takes time to build and is difficult to 
transfer. Author’s interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006. 
32 Author’s interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May 2006. 
33 The absence of effective systems for collecting and transferring lessons learned was 
also encountered in connection with other “non-traditional” areas such as psychological 
operations and press and information activity (P&I). For example, one P&I officer in an 
established mission where the Danish presence was already year-long found no 
recorded information from previous P&I officers about their experience with local 
media and journalists, how to approach them, the level of independence and objectivity 
of different media etc. 
 54
The problem of loosing too many lessons between rotations is broadly 
recognised. Some countries, for example Canada, address the problem by 
operating with staggered rotation of CIMIC units: Only half the team rotate 
at any one time, ensuring that experienced members always overlap with 
new ones.34 Others, like Germany and France, have created institutional 
anchors for accumulation of expertise with their CIMIC units. Danish 
CIMIC/RUD personnel, in contrast, typically have no prior experience of 
project work, and therefore not only need to get acquainted with a new 
geographic area, but also with a new function.35 
 
In Denmark, each deployed team does an end-of-tour-report. This report, 
however, mainly focuses on practical and technical issues. A system for 
monitoring and analysing impact, and capturing and transmitting CPA 
lessons learned over the longer term is lacking, both in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan. Who benefits? Are projects sustainable? How does one 
prevent the projects becoming targets of anti-coalition forces? How does 
one maximise the transfer of skills to local actors? Is there an impact on 
security in the medium-term? What is the impact on local perceptions of 
the local/national administration and of the international forces (and thus 
presumably on force protection)? These are questions of crucial importance 
to mission success. Within the current system, however, it is quite likely 
that many of these questions are never asked, that some answers are lost 
between rotations, and that others are never found because they emerge 
only when trends and issues are analysed over the longer-term.36 
 
 
Access to Security Escorts 
 
RUD/CIMIC typically operates in teams of two soldiers. Regular forces 
provide security. Thus, in order to move around, attend meetings, monitor 
project work and so on, RUD/CIMIC depends on access to security escorts. 
In areas with a relatively benign security environment, getting the 
necessary (and typically smaller) escorts has not posed any problems. 
However, in areas with a more hostile environment, with more focus on 
force protection and the demand for a larger security escort, RUD/CIMIC 
had, at times, difficulty asserting its need for escorts. In Iraq, for instance, 
some RUD teams experienced periods where they were largely confined to 
                                                 
34 Peabody, David. 2005. The Challenges of Doing Good Work: The Development of 
Canadian Forces CIMIC. Paper Submitted for the CDAI Conference: 10. 
35 The same is true for soldiers assigned to other “non-traditional” areas. Unlike in 
bigger countries, Denmark has no special psychological operations unit or P&I unit. 
Danish officers are thus not specialising in these tasks and typically have no prior 
experience with them. 
36 Author’s interviews and observations, Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006; Camp 
Danevang, April 2006. 
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camp. In reaction to this problem, in early 2006, it was decided to dedicate 
a platoon from the Danish Battle Group in Iraq to RUD escorts.37 Yet, even 
after the designation of a “RUD protection unit” a number of requested and 
planned escorts were still cancelled. The problem is probably larger than 
that which appears at first sight. Interviews indicated that RUD personnel 
would at times refrain from even requesting escorts in order not to strain 
the Battle Group further.38 
 
A related issue raised in the interviews was the amount of attention paid by 
commanding officers to the work of RUD/CIMIC units. Many expressed 
frustration at the perceived lack of interest in their efforts, and complained 
of difficulties “getting attention and being taken seriously.” Some 
interviewees claimed that commanders hardly ever took time to visit CPA 
projects, except in connection with VIP visits from home. There were 
dissenting voices, however, who insisted that when explained properly and 
pushed energetically, attention and resources, such as security escorts, 
came forward. Typically, such assertions came from ambitious and 
articulate officers of the line, assigned to CIMIC functions.39 The author 
encountered no instances of a commander joining a RUD/CIMIC team on 
monitoring visits, meetings, or hand-over of a project, even if commanders 
were, generally, aiming to show presence on the ground and join operative 
units in their work. 
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Recent years have seen increased political pressure on the armed forces to 
solve a number of civil-support tasks, in particular to support economic 
reconstruction in conflict areas where civil agencies and organisations are 
precluded from operating. Some scholars, however, have argued that while 
these tasks might have been accepted on the surface they are in reality 
neglected. The military culture, it is argued, is averse to accepting these 
tasks.  
 
My report Soldiers and state-building: The approach of the Danish armed 
forces to reconstruction support shows that Danish RUD/CIMIC units 
actually perform very well as measured against basic principles of good 
project work, also confirm that these units are indeed neglected in terms of 
                                                 
37 Author’s interviews, Basra Palace and Camp Danevang April 2006. 
38 The difficulties to ensure security escorts also applied to individuals and units 
engaged in other non-traditional military tasks, such as police training and mentoring. 
Author’s interviews and observations, December 2005, Copenhagen; Camp Danevang 
and Basra Palace, April 2006. 
39 Author’s interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006. 
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planning, assignment, and access to resources. The report, however, has 
demonstrated that the reasons are less straightforward than assumed by the 
cultural aversion argument. It shows that while cultural beliefs about 
mission and means indeed incline the Danish armed forces to give 
precedence to traditional military tasks over CPA, deeper notions about 
human beings and human relations are compatible, even supportive of 
CPA. This has implications when discussing how the implementation of 
CPA might be improved. The cultural aversion argument would indicate 
the need for a general engineered cultural adjustment; a process which, 
according to most culturalists is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Report leaves room for more optimism. Some degree of cultural 
adjustment, for example, as suggested by Edgar H. Schein, through 
changes to education and socialisation, would indeed be required.40 Yet, the 
underlying affinity between the core values of the Danish armed forces and 
CPA should make the challenge of promoting cognitive change less 
formidable.  
 
In summary, the cultural notions about mission and means of the Danish 
armed forces, complicating the performance of CPA, could be challenged 
through changes to current educational curricula combined with an effort to 
document the importance of CPA to reach military and mission end-states. 
 
Currently, CIMIC, CPA and reconstruction support barely plays a role in 
the basic schooling of Danish officers at the officers’ schools of the 
different services and at the Danish Defence Academy. Many of the 
respondents interviewed displayed a clear understanding of the importance 
of CIMIC and CPA at the conceptual level. Yet, at the same time, the 
author watched these tasks slip down the list of priorities in a pressured 
situation, to the advantage of the directly security-related issues – issues 
taught, trained, and internalised throughout the officers’ training. The fact 
that Danish RUD/CIMIC units perform very well on the tactical level, 
ironically, complicates the efforts of those who advocate an adjustment of 
the training curricula. The counterargument is obvious: “But any good 
Danish officer of the line can already do CIMIC.” 
 
Moreover, although historical analogy and the few existing interview based 
studies looking at local perceptions in conflict areas strongly suggest the 
importance of reconstruction when it comes to winning local support, the 
armed forces lack a system for measuring and monitoring the impact of 
CPA on this support. In fact, the absence of analysis and evaluation of the 
impact of RUD/CIMIC work, discussed above, reflects a broader problem 
                                                 
40 See Edgar H. Schein. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.  
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within the armed forces. There is a general lack of methodology for 
measuring how the various lines of operation of a deployed contingent, 
including tactical military operations, impact on hearts and minds. That is, 
we know too little about the impact of the different instruments of a 
deployed Danish contingent on the core of current operations. Are 
arrest/search/destroy operations self-defeating in sense that they upset 
people to the extent of creating more enemies and problems than they 
remove them? Officers might have an impression of the development over 
their tour of duty, even though the causality might remain murky. 
However, the evidence is conflicting. Some officers believe that operations 
actually work, while others contend that they inflame and that new 
criminals will always fill the ranks. Currently, there are simply no good 
answers to these questions.41 
 
If existing cultural notions about mission and means are to be challenged 
and adjusted, there is a pressing need to develop a way of demonstrating 
and comparing the effectiveness of various lines of operation, including 
CPA, when it comes to reaching military and mission end states. Even if 
operationalizing ways of measuring whether “hearts and minds” have been 
won is difficult, it should not be impossible. A combination of indicators 
such as the number of incidents where coalition forces are targeted, the 
volume of actionable intelligence from locals, the support to militias and so 
on could be used.42 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Of course, there is also the possibility that waves of violence against the international 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan might be largely independent of the actions of the 
deployed units. It is possible that they simply reflect that the longer an operation runs, 
the higher the level of local disillusionment with the international presence. This would 
call for a rethinking of the 1990s peacekeeping paradigm, which emphasised the 
importance of a long-term military presence to ensure time for reconciliation and for 
new local governance structures to take root. If indeed a long-term presence is not just 
part of the solution, but also of the problem, it is even more critical that training and 
capacity-building take centre stage.  
42 A related challenge is the need to de-conflict and coordinate the different lines of 
operation. There is also, some interviewees indicated, a lack of methodology to measure 
political impact of tactical military operations. “Even if we plan to de-conflict once on 
the ground we fall back into old habits” as put by one CIMIC officer. One example 
might be the political repercussions of the detainment policy of the British Brigade 
deployed to Basra. As the Iraqi justice system was still perceived as too inefficient, 
detainees were kept for longer periods to win time. Yet, the detentions were used by 
local politicians as an excuse for disrupting the cooperation with the international forces 
over the spring 2006. The consequence, in turn, was that police training and capacity 
building were grounded during that period. Author’s interviews, Camp Danevang, April 
2006. 
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Lastly and most importantly, high level political pressure to keep minds 
focused is indispensable. Large organisations always involve people of 
different mindsets and obviously, placing more emphasis on CPA will be 
resisted from some quarters for different reasons. The lack of strategic 
planning for CPA, for example, requires action from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the problem of the lack of a system for capturing and 
transmitting RUD/CIMIC lessons learned requires action from the armed 
forces.  
 
CPA is no universal panacea. It will not stop hard-core insurgents, foreign 
terrorists, and local war lords from resisting the international presence in 
areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, CPA is a way of mobilising and 
coordinating efforts and resources faster, to ensure that reconstruction and 
capacity-building get under way, including in areas where civil actors are 
not able or willing to operate. CPA obviously cannot and should not stand 
alone; reconstruction support is an important and indispensable element in 
winning local socio-political support and creating viable local governance 
structures and is thus a key to mission success.  
 
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen is Senior Fellow and Head of the Research Unit 
“Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization” at the Danish Institute 
for International Studies (DIIS).  
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The Revolution in Military Affairs and Changing Security 
Concerns: Implications for Small States 
Bernard F.W. Loo1 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological 
University 
 
 
By now, the idea of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) – the argument 
that radical changes in military and military-related technologies are 
fundamentally and radically changing the manner in which military forces 
organise, operate and fulfil their strategic functions – almost seems passé, 
inasmuch as there is a large body of opinion that insists that an RMA is 
currently extant.2 Indeed, this body of opinion provides a predominant 
understanding of this RMA – that the current RMA is technologically 
driven, and that the first signs of its emergence came in the 1991 Gulf War 
against Iraq.3 
 
This study accepts the assertion that no military organisation can afford to 
be static in nature and capability, since any military organisation reflects 
the unique set of social, economic, material and political circumstances 
from which it derives. Changes in any one of these circumstances might 
therefore be sufficient in and of itself to effect changes in the military 
organisation. This RMA appears to be driven primarily, if not exclusively, 
by technological factors; in any case, the technological dynamic suggests 
that capabilities and equipment eventually become obsolete; for armed 
                                                 
1 The author wishes to thank Morten Hansen for his assistance in some background 
research for this paper. 
2 For instance, James Adams, The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapon and the 
Front Line Is Everywhere (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998); John Arquilla & 
David Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1997); Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare”, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Lawrence Freedman, “The 
Revolution in Military Affairs”, Adelphi Paper, no. 318 (1998); Robin F. Laird and 
Holger H. Mey, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives, Washington, 
DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999; Michael 
O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000); Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.), 
Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air War College Studies in 
National Security, no. 3 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995); 
Keith Thomas (ed.), The Revolution in Military Affairs: Warfare in the Information Age 
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1997). 
3 Frank Kendall, “Exploiting the Military Technical Revolution: a Concept for Joint 
Warfare,” Strategic Review, Spring, 1992, pp. 23-30; Michael J. Mazaar, et al., Military 
Technical Revolution: a Structural Framework, Final Report of the Study Group on the 
Military Technical Revolution, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Washington, DC, March, 1993, pp. 17-39;  
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forces to remain relevant and effective, they will have to undergo periodic 
change, both in terms of its hardware and capabilities as well as in terms of 
its doctrines and strategies. 
 
These changes, however, can be extremely difficult to manage. Change 
necessarily brings the organisation into the unknown. It is somewhat 
analogous to the voyages of discovery that the great European explorers 
like Vasco da Gama, Amerigo Vespucci and Christopher Columbus 
undertook. Such voyages of discovery are often costly in terms of material 
and lives. For military organisations, the potential cost of a wrong turn 
assumes greater significance, since this could mean defeat in war that could 
possibly trigger an existential crisis for the state. This potential cost makes 
it understandable for military organisations to be very leery of change, 
especially drastic and disruptive change that the RMA portends. 
 
However, as this study will demonstrate, the RMA will result in a smaller, 
leaner, but (hopefully) more capable military organisation. The RMA 
trumpets these qualities as virtues, but as this study will subsequently show, 
these may also be regarded as necessities, given the escalating costs of new 
technologies and capabilities. Even for large military organisations such as 
the United States military, this is already creating pressures on scarce 
resources. The potential implications for small military organisations can 
only be even more daunting. 
 
The issue of maximising scarce resources comes especially to the forefront 
with the issue of emerging security challenges that appear to expand the 
number of scenarios in which military organisations might plausibly find 
themselves deployed to. As noted earlier, military organisations also 
respond to changes in various environmental conditions. There is also a 
security dimension to the environment that military organisations respond 
to – or at least they ought to. This extant RMA started as an attempt to find 
a solution to a peculiar Cold War problem – namely, how to defeat massed 
Warsaw Pact heavy armour on the central plains of the European continent, 
without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons whose use would almost 
certainly have resulted in global nuclear Armageddon. As this paper will 
later demonstrate, there is a growing body of opinion that the current 
security conditions facing most states has moved away from traditional 
state-oriented concerns about war towards so-called non-traditional security 
concerns such as peace operations, low-intensity operations such as 
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, and humanitarian and disaster 
relief operations stemming from pandemics and natural disasters. This 
paper does not assess the validity of these claims, but does argue that 
inasmuch as these non-traditional security concerns are the main priority of 
policy makers, the RMA may create a military organisation that will be 
excellent for strategic tasks that are rapidly becoming less and less likely. 
 61
Finally, one methodological observation is necessary. This study casts its 
argument at the level of small states but examines the case of the Singapore 
Armed Forces. The Singapore Armed Forces is an interesting case, mainly 
because for the small size of Singapore, the Singaporean military appears 
to ‘punch above its weight’. Nevertheless, the concerns suggested above 
apply equally from the specific to the general case. Furthermore, the 
Singapore Armed Forces remains one of the few military organisations 
around the world of its size that has sought to undertake the RMA. 
 
 
Manifesting the RMA 
 
The Nature of the RMA 
 
The critical technologies behind this RMA are in information processing 
and communications, which facilitate information dominance, precision 
targeting and joint-service operations. A military organisation that has 
undergone this RMA – in other words, a transformed military – can utilise 
information dominance to minimise the fog of war while thickening it for 
their opponent. This is achieved through the networking of different sensor 
systems into a seamless web to allow for the gathering of “real-time, 
continuous, target-quality information on all significant enemy assets [in 
tandem with] advanced command, control and communications [that] then 
transforms this data along with information on friendly forces into a single 
real-time near-perfect picture of the battle space available to all 
commanders [allowing them] to target, shape and distort the enemy’s 
understanding of the same battle space.”4 
 
Secondly, improvements in precision targeting render increasingly likely 
the prospects of single-shot kills. Together with information dominance, 
precision weapons promise near-certain destruction, which promises to 
make warfare much more efficient than ever, and to almost guarantee the 
desired strategic outcomes. It is the destruction of the most important 
targets (that is, intensive destruction), rather than indiscriminate saturation 
bombings (that is, extensive destruction) as was witnessed in World War II, 
that determines military success. Long-range standoff-range weapon 
systems may be particularly important because they can strike from 
locations that are beyond the range of most hostile weapons.5 The 
transformed military can therefore utterly dominate the battle space. The 
size of the military organisation, in the process, no longer becomes the 
                                                 
4 Mark Hewish, “Fishing in the Data Stream,” International Defense Review, July, 
1994, p. 51. 
5 Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree (eds.), The Information Revolution and 
International Security (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1998). 
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determinant of military power, and a smaller but more capable military 
force might be able to utterly dominate a larger but less capable 
counterpart. 
 
Finally, information technology facilitates joint-service integration – that 
is, the networking of all parts of the military organisation – that results in a 
military organisation with a net capability that far outstrips the mere sum of 
its parts. This refers to force multiplier effects that accrue from the prospect 
of being able to locate and destroy any emerging target in the battle space 
with precision weapons launched from any available weapons platform that 
just happens to be within range of the emerging target. This force multiplier 
effect is the result of the creation – through the joint integration of 
information resources earlier discussed – of a common organisation-wide 
awareness of the battle space. A target on the land can be attacked and 
destroyed by military assets from land, air or naval platforms. There is 
therefore no more truly land, or air, or naval force – all three services have 
been merged into one seamless organisation. 
 
The End Result – A Transformed (?) Military Organisation 
 
Together, these three aspects of the RMA promise a military organisation 
that is an increasingly lethal and capable of unprecedented levels of precise 
destruction.6 What a military organisation that has undergone an RMA 
looks like, however, is still a matter of some uncertainty. From the manner 
in which the RMA has promised to transform military power earlier 
discussed, however, some possibilities can be discerned. At one level, the 
RMA promises to “change the basic relationship between offence and 
defence, space and time, and fire and manoeuvre.”7 The pervasive, real-
time, organisation-wide battle space awareness that flows from the 
revolutions in information and communications technologies will affect 
conventional military operations, by firstly compressing the time factor in 
military planning. At the same time, however, the battle space will expand. 
The traditional distinctions between the forward edge of the battle area and 
the administrative and logistics rear areas will become increasingly blurred, 
precisely because of pervasive awareness allied to precision long-range 
weaponry; this creates an opportunity to bring joint combat power against 
precisely targeted aspects of the enemy’s centres of gravity. This was the 
promise of strategic air power theory ala Guilio Douhet – the ability to 
bypass the land battle space altogether and precisely attack the enemy’s 
centres of gravity far in the rear. It is this increasing lethality that the RMA 
                                                 
6 Robert W. Chandler, The New Face of War: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 
Revitalisation of America’s Transoceanic Military Strategy (McLean, VA: AMCODA 
Press, 1998). 
7 Kapil Kak, “Revolution in Military Affairs-An Appraisal”, Strategic Analysis, April 
2000. 
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promises that leads to a corollary observation concerning the future shape 
of the military organisation – namely, that such armed forces can trade 
quantity for quality, they can be smaller, leaner, still pack a heavy punch, 
and therefore be more agile, more flexible and responsive. 
 
Secondly, and as a consequence of the first, the RMA might render 
irrelevant the operational level of war, at least in its extant manifestation.8 
The operational level of war is challenged by the increasingly rapid tempo 
of future wars. The notions of campaigns, operations and phases are 
increasingly irrelevant in wars that are increasingly determined in days, 
even hours. Even as recent as the 1991 Gulf War, there were two 
discernible phases – Operation Desert Shield to initially protect Saudi 
Arabia from possible Iraqi invasion and to build up Coalition force levels 
to a level sufficient for the liberation of Kuwait, and Operation Desert 
Storm, the actual liberation of Kuwait. Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, 
however, saw no discernible phases or operations, but manifested itself as 
one short, seamless campaign. 
 
However, the RMA presents a potential dilemma: most analysis of the 
RMA leans towards the destruction of hierarchy as a result of real-time 
horizontal and vertical connectivity. But connectivity works both ways, and 
increased vertical connectivity does not merely result in better upwards 
information flows, it also facilitates greater top-down micromanagement.9 
Information networks lend themselves to flatter structures. These 
technologies therefore challenge the continued primacy of existing (and 
often stubborn) hierarchical structures and command cultures in military 
organisations. The functional organisation of the military may also have to 
undergo a radical re-think. Layers of middle management may need to be 
removed. If the functional structures have to be revamped, this will have 
implications for the nature of command. But this is only one possible 
outcome. As noted earlier, it is also possible to see greater connectivity 
resulting in even greater levels of centralised command and control. the 
removal of layers of middle management resulting in the shortening of 
distances between upper echelons and lower echelons may result in the 
empowerment of lower echelons to independent actions all within the aim 
and intent of the operation (so-called Auftragstaktik) but the shorter 
distance between supreme command and foot soldier also means it is 
increasingly possible to supreme command to intervene in a single foot 
soldier’s actions. Which way the RMA will go in this regard is still up for 
grabs. 
 
                                                 
8 Steven Metz, “The Next Twist of the RMA”, in Parameters, Autumn 2000. 
9 Kapil Kak, “Revolution in Military Affairs-An Appraisal”, Strategic Analysis, April 
2000. 
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Absorbing the RMA 
 
Geopolitical Conditions 
 
Not every state can engage with this RMA, however. In the Asia Pacific, 
Paul Dibb highlights a key point for regional powers who may want to 
engage with this RMA.10 In attempting to determine which regional armed 
forces are RMA-ready, Dibb argues that there are three key discriminators: 
the relationship to the US, the capacity to absorb RMA technologies, and 
threat perception. 
 
It is important to accept that regional countries will adapt the RMA concept 
to their own assessments of how to deal with credible military threats. 
Those regional states which worry about higher levels of potential military 
threat from well-armed neighbours may be more attracted to the concept. 
Conversely, countries which perceive a non-threatening or benign strategic 
environment may (correctly or incorrectly) see little utility in the RMA. 
There may be a third category of countries which – whilst perceiving no 
immediate threat – seek to assert a margin of military excellence through 
the judicious use of the RMA adapted to their particular geographical and 
technological circumstances. This latter point raises another related issue. 
The RMA as developed by the United States is generally perceived in the 
region as too expensive and being on a scale of offensive fire power that 
has limited relevance to most (but not all) countries in the region. 
 
Dibb’s analysis focused on the Asia Pacific region, but the analysis is 
equally applicable to any state wanting to engage in the RMA. Basically, 
for any armed forces to be able to successfully engage the RMA, it must 
meet a number of core requirements. The first is systems integration skills, 
which are the most demanding aspect, since they place great demands on 
the country’s education systems to nurture those skills and the qualities of 
creativity, innovation and independence of thinking. In the Asia Pacific 
region, with the professed Confucian ethos that underpins many of the 
region’s countries, this will of particular difficulty, given Confucianism’s 
emphasis on cultural and societal conformity.  
 
Secondly, the development of joint force doctrine is required for the 
organisational changes associated with the RMA. In the Asia Pacific, this 
has traditionally been an issue that has not been given sufficient attention – 
attention has tended to be given to the acquisition of weapons systems 
without necessarily developing the doctrines needed to seamlessly 
integrating these weapons systems into existing or new force structures. 
                                                 
10 Robin Laird and Holger Mey, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied 
Perspectives”, McNair Paper 60 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999). 
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Separate single-service cultures tend to be the norm in the Asia Pacific 
region. Thirdly, joint force operations require an integrated logistic support 
and maintenance structure. Here Asian states are even in worse shape than 
with regard to joint doctrine. Finally, the systems integration challenge is 
made even more difficult by the proliferation of different technologies and 
technological standards in the Asia Pacific region, indeed within a single 
country’s armed forces. It is not uncommon for regional armed forces to 
have within its force structure weapons systems acquired from United 
States/NATO as well as Russian sources. Integrating disparate weapons 
systems may prove to be an insurmountable challenge. Dibb concludes that 
Asian approaches to military transformation will necessarily have to start 
with cooperation with the United States, given the latter’s dominance of the 
discourse. Given the increasingly poor public diplomatic image that the 
United States has in some parts of the Asia Pacific region, this is becoming 
an increasingly unpalatable option, certainly one that is becoming more and 
more difficult to persuade regional electorates to support. 
 
Overcoming Organisational Obstacles 
 
For most states embarking on their RMA agendas, these technologies 
possess a significant potential to negatively impact on organisational 
structures and work processes. For mature conventional military 
organisations, the change might be even more important, dramatic and 
disturbing – leading to quite plausibly fundamental changes in both the 
organisational structure as well as the operating doctrines of the armed 
forces in armed conflict. 
 
Even the most modern of military organisations is essentially an industrial-
era organisation, characterised by centralised controls and processes 
manned by a large body of staff, fairly rigid hierarchies, and high degrees 
of functional specialisations. Such organisations regard information as a 
means to an end, whereas the current information revolution sees 
information as an end in itself. Martin Van Creveld argues that such 
industrial-era organisations tend to suffer from ‘information pathology’ – 
one example being how rapidly growing message traffic in Vietnam 
clogged the extant military signals networks, with little or no ability to 
differentiate from low to high-priority signals.11 Such an industrial-era 
model may have been good where the competitive advantage lay in 
maximising output (and information was the tool for maximising output), 
                                                 
11 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985), pp. 247-48. 
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but may be ill adapted to situations where the focus of attention shifts to 
information as the end product.12 
 
In the case of the Singapore Armed Forces, current thinking is encapsulated 
in its IKC2 concept (integrated knowledge-based command and control), 
which emphasises network-enabled and knowledge-based warfighting and 
tactical and operational decision-making, utilising the full range of 
command, control and communications, as well as intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.13 While it is probably 
incorrect to read too much into this, it is nevertheless interesting – and 
potentially informative – that this new strategic concept retains emphasis 
on command and control. The key weakness will likely be the tendency to 
retain rigid hierarchical command and control structures. It is not entirely 
clear if transformational technologies can work well in traditional force 
structures and hierarchies. Some debates within the Singapore Armed 
Forces regarding the future shape of the organisation are beginning to 
argue, however, that the Singapore Armed Forces should adopt a “flatter 
and more network-based system”.14 Others argue that the organisation 
ought to be re-organised around brigades rather than divisions.15 
 
Another potential problem, one that may prove even more intractable, is the 
conscript nature of the Singapore Armed Forces. Can one expect a soldier 
to be fully trained in networked operations in two years of full-time active 
service and another ten years of reserve training (up to forty days a year of 
military training in the reserves) on the new technologies and capabilities? 
The danger then is in dividing the armed forces into two entities – a ‘smart’ 
transformed active service, and a ‘dumb’ version. 
 
Affording the Revolution in Military Affairs 
 
Value for money – translated into economy, efficiency and effectiveness – 
is becoming an increasing priority for all government agencies, especially 
the armed forces, which is almost always the single largest consumer of 
public resources. For small states like Singapore, this is an even more 
difficult problem to overcome. For the modern military organisation, this 
                                                 
12 W. Richard Scott, Organisations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems 2nd ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, 1987), pp. 76-92. 
13 Jacqueline Lee et al., “Realising Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and 
Control: Transforming the SAF”, Pointer Monograph No.2 (Singapore: SAFTI Military 
Institute, 2003). 
14 Seet Pi Shen, “The revolution in military affairs (RMA): challenge to existing 
military paradigms and its impact on the Singapore Armed Forces”, Pointer, vol. 27, no. 
2 (April-June 2001), p. 16. 
15 Fong Kum Kuen, “A quantum leap towards knowledge warfare: revolution in military 
organisations in the SAF”, Pointer, vol. 27, no. 2 (April-June 2001), pp. 80, 92, 94. 
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aim translates into the minimisation of the so-called ‘tail end’ of the 
military (the non-combat, support side) to the ‘teeth end’ (the combat side). 
Ron Matthews argues that value for money has become even more 
important in the current RMA, given the increasing high costs of emerging 
weapons systems and technologies.16 Current combat systems are simply a 
lot more expensive than their predecessors, and this has resulted in a kind 
of structural disarmament, whereby states and military organisations can 
afford ever-decreasing numbers of new weapons systems and platforms. 
Nowhere is this more prevalent than in air power, as successive generations 
of combat aircraft are becoming more and more expensive.17 A case in 
point is the Singapore air force’s fourth generation combat aircraft 
programme, which has resulted in the acquisition of 12 F-15SGs as a 
replacement for the existing fleet of A-4SUs and F-5Es. 
 
Against this pattern of ever-increasing costs of new weapons systems and 
platforms, even the advanced countries find the required expenditures 
prohibitive. The identified solution has been to move towards off-the-shelf 
purchase (often accompanied by licensed production) and collaborative 
procurement or weapons research development (such as the Eurofighter 
Typhoon and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter). Singapore is one participant in 
such collaborative programmes, having joined the Joint Strike Fighter 
programme in 1999 as a ‘Level 3 participant’.18 In February 2003, this 
participation was upgraded to a ‘security cooperation participant’ at a cost 
of US$50 million in the system design and development phase.19 Such 
international collaborations appear to be an attractive option, but as 
Matthews shows elsewhere, this can be problematic.20 These measures are 
designed to mitigate the problems of affordability for the RMA, but these 
problems remain. 
 
                                                 
16 Ron Matthews, “Managing the revolution in military affairs”, paper presented at 
IDSS Conference on Revolutions in Military Affairs: Processes, Problems and 
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Senior Singapore Armed Forces officials are aware of the potential long-
term impact of ever-increasing costs of new weapons systems.21 This is 
especially the case since the organisation envisages transformation across-
the-board. Given the slower rates of economic growth that appear to 
accompany economic maturity, this means that with its self-imposed cap of 
defence spending at six percent of GDP (less than two percent of the 
United States or 12 percent of Japan’s military spending), putting into place 
an RMA agenda for the Singapore Armed Forces will be a difficult 
business. 
 
 
Matching the RMA to New Security Challenges 
 
The ‘New Security Agenda’ 
 
In any case, the RMA may result in a military organisation that is at odds 
with its main security mission or operations. A debate has emerged as to 
the nature of the security agenda in the 21st Century for states and military 
organisations. Mary Kaldor22 distinguished between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars, 
and argued that ‘new’ wars are a growing trend. Thomas Hammes23 argued 
for the concept of generational warfare, and suggested that current security 
concerns revolve around what he calls Fourth Generation Warfare. Bruce 
Berkowitz24 goes further, and argues that the terrain of 21st Century war 
will be the virtual world of cyberspace and communications networks. 
Whereas Colin Gray25 argues that these debates are in a sense meaningless 
– that the manifestations of war may change, but the real issue is to 
remember that war in its essence remains the same. 
 
The apparent lack of consensus amongst scholars of strategy and war ought 
not to obfuscate what appears to be undeniable – namely, that states 
increasingly are making decisions about the nature of the security 
environments they exist in, and the likely security concerns they face. From 
Europe through to the Antipodes, more and more states are come to the 
conclusion that the traditional security concerns – revolving around 
                                                 
21 See, for example, comments by Chief Defence Scientist Professor Lui Pao Chuen, 
‘Weapons of the future: let’s think out of the box’, The Straits Times, 12 July 2003. 
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invasion by other state actors, concerns of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty – are being replaced by a ‘new security agenda’ focusing not 
on the threat of what Stephen Biddle26 called major war, but rather security 
concerns such as low-intensity military operations, peace operations 
ranging from enforcement to support, and humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations. The soldier today is more likely to be deployed in such non-
traditional (and unfamiliar) roles including peace operations, humanitarian 
and disaster relief, and counter-terrorism – so-called operations other than 
war – rather than the traditional defence of the state against foreign 
invasion. However, these roles are inherently problematic,27 and require 
skill sets different from those that conventional military operations 
demand, which typically do not occupy very much attention in the training 
regimes of modern militaries.28 Indeed these skills might even run against 
the grain of the more traditional warrior skills a soldier is supposed to have. 
 
If nothing else, there is every possibility that the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
security agendas can come crashing together. In The Strategic Corporal: 
Leadership in the Three Block War, Charles Krulak paints a scenario where 
a soldier needs to decide on a course of action that may have implications 
on the strategic level.29 In one city block, his comrades are fighting a 
classic conventional military operation; in the next block, his comrades are 
engaged in a counter-insurgency operation; in the third block, yet more of 
his comrades are engaged in a humanitarian relief operation. In the new 
security landscape, every soldier needs to be equipped with the skill sets 
that will allow him to move seamlessly from one ‘block’ to the next. Under 
such conditions, the soldier needs to be able to immediately access the ‘big 
picture’ and be constantly aligned with the overall intent; otherwise that 
soldier will be unable to execute his missions with purpose and clarity. Of 
course, this ability to disseminate the ‘big picture’ to all levels of the 
military enterprise is precisely the RMA currently promises, and to be fair, 
appears to deliver. 
 
If this is correct, then the command chain will have to provide more of 
‘bottom-up reporting’ than the traditional ‘top-down managing’. In a 
traditional military structure, layers of command are set up to maintain 
command and control; the question is, will these layers of command 
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impede the efficiency of dealing with the new security challenges? Bengt 
Anderberg suggests that a new Command structure is needed that will 
introduce a civilian presence and input so as to enforce “rapid co-ordination 
of the basic military and civil functions”.30 But there are also arguments to 
suggest that disruptions to the traditional military command structures may 
prove ineffective due to traditional mindsets.31 In response to the new 
demands, perhaps the approach ought to focus on flexible hierarchies and 
structures that can be easily task-organised to suit the nature of the 
situation. Preferably, command structures ought to have sufficient 
flexibility such that any relevant non-military agency can be brought in to 
address the specific issue and task. Whatever changes the militaries make, 
it is important to note that there cannot be a ‘one size fits all’ structure or 
method to address the spectrum of operations the military organisation has 
to perform. 
 
Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terror Operations 
 
It is always tempting to employ the military in counter-terrorism efforts. 
Military organisations almost always have the necessary manpower and the 
skills for counter-terrorism. Inasmuch as terrorist bases and facilities can be 
located, through the use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
capabilities that are the purview of military organisations, these can be 
attacked and destroyed by either the careful insertion of trained military 
operatives or the precise application of standoff-range firepower. Even the 
more passive counter-terror measures – such as the guarding of critical 
infrastructure – resonates with that most mind-numbingly boring yet 
necessary of military tasks – the provision of guards and sentries. Tapping 
this reservoir of manpower resources for counter-terrorism efforts therefore 
appears to make sense. Furthermore, it appears at first glance that the RMA 
does hold promise for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism 
operations.32 The operational promises of the RMA – that with modern 
command, control and communications systems, information can be made 
more available to commanders to provide them a clearer situational picture 
of the area of operation, allowing a faster operational cycle. 
 
That counter-insurgency and counter-terror missions are going to be more 
frequent in the near term seems an almost universally held opinion now. 
But these will likely be terrorists and insurgents unlike their predecessors – 
rather, these will be combatants who are as computer-savvy as their 
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counterparts. The information technology revolution has become a double-
edged sword. Terrorists are also able to access technology that is 
commercially available to carry out operations against states that have 
strong military forces. This is the argument that Thomas X. Hammes makes 
in his book, The Sling and the Stone.33 United States military forces in Iraq 
are currently facing such insurgents. This presents a dilemma to all 
militaries as post war operations are certainly more complicated than ever 
before. 
 
However, even if the insurgent or terrorist was of a more ‘traditional’ 
nature, a cautionary note is needed.34 The principles of counter-terrorism 
and counter-insurgency are not entirely consonant with the principles of 
conventional warfare. The military mindset focuses on proactive problem-
solving – find the problem and then fix or destroy it. It is reflected in two 
axioms – ‘Never send in a man when a bullet will do’; and ‘Firepower is 
cheaper than manpower’. Success can then be easily determined – at least, 
if the threat emanates from another state’s regular conventional forces. 
However, firepower is a whole lot more expensive in the highly politicised 
milieu of counter-terrorism, where the critical effort resides in so-called 
“hearts and minds” measures.  
 
Even when military force can be brought to bear in counter-terrorism, for 
example, when terrorist bases are located, the application of firepower has 
to be very carefully calibrated, so as to not incur unnecessary levels of 
destruction, especially collateral damage. This, of course, is where the 
RMA excels in – the ability to conduct accurate broad-range surveillance 
and reconnaissance to locate enemy positions and targets and the precise 
application of firepower against these targets thereafter. However, terrorists 
and their bases are not so easy to locate and destroy, otherwise the problem 
would not be as intractable as it seems. Counter-terrorism more typically 
involves passive security measures – the guarding of critical infrastructure 
and installations, which more resemble law enforcement and policing. In 
both law enforcement and counter-terrorism, the measure of success is 
reflected in the absence of incidents. Restraint in the use of force is 
desirable in counter-terrorism, but this may run against the grain of the 
military mindset. 
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Singapore’s security planners have been increasingly pre-occupied with the 
emergence of the asymmetric challenges posed by terrorist organisations, 
accentuated by the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and the 
December 2001 arrest of 15 members of Jemaah Islamiah. The Singapore 
government saw these developments as a validation of the existing concept 
of Total Defence, which involves non-military and military agencies in 
ensuring Singapore’s security.35 Indeed, the Singapore government took the 
concept a step further with the announcement in November 2001 that a 
‘homeland security’ strategy would be adopted, involving closer 
cooperation between the military, law enforcement and customs and 
immigration agencies.36 
 
Peace Operations 
 
It would appear undeniable that conventional wars are being increasingly 
supplanted by insurgencies and civil wars,37 even if there is contrary 
evidence, from the Correlates of War project that shows that inter-state 
high-intensity conventional wars do occur on a fairly regular basis.38 One 
priority item in this ‘new security agenda’ has been peace operations 
ranging from peace enforcement to peace keeping. Certainly, military 
organisations have been increasingly involved in these types of 
operations.39 As of October 2006, the United Nations has deployed 80,976 
military and police personnel in 18 different peace operations around the 
world.40 
 
It is not only United Nations-sanctioned peace operations that have 
increased in numbers. What has also increased is the number of so-called 
low-intensity conflicts; indeed, since World War 2, only 12 percent of 
conflicts can be classified as high-intensity conflicts.41 One study actually 
goes so far as to argue that the majority of conflicts in the medium term 
will be low-intensity intra-state in nature, rather than high-intensity and 
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inter-state.42 Yet another study shows that the probability of states 
becoming involved in inter-state conflicts has dropped from 1 in 28 from 
1918-1941, to 1 in 167 from 1945-1990 and 1 in 250 from 1991-2003.43 As 
the United States experience in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan show, a military organisation skilled at high-intensity 
conventional operations can flounder in the less familiar terrain of low-
intensity conflict. 
 
Both ends of the spectrum of peace operations are not always entirely 
similar, and either may demand different skill sets from the soldiers 
deployed for such missions. At the peace enforcement end of the spectrum, 
it is plausible enough to assume that soldiers deployed in such missions 
may find operational challenges not entirely dissimilar to their comrades 
engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign. The potential advantages that 
accrue from the RMA to counter-insurgency operations ought, therefore, to 
apply to peace enforcement operations, inasmuch as the opponent engages 
in insurgent activities. Peace support operations, however, appear to 
demand different skill sets. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the 
demands of peace operations dovetail with the capabilities that the RMA 
will endow on military organisations. In peace operations, the mission aim 
is to avoid and prevent conflict and casualties; soldiers are expected to 
display non-threatening behaviour, which runs against the grain of their 
training. There is increasing recognition of the different challenges that 
peace operations impose on militaries, and the acceptance of the need for 
specialised training – such as the creation of the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Centre in Canada. 
 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations 
 
Another security concern may be the use of the military organisation in 
humanitarian and disaster relief operations. In a way, this is not a new 
operational challenge for most military organisations, as it has been fairly 
commonplace for governments to mobilise its military organisation in 
times of natural disaster. The United States military’s deployment in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina is merely a more recent manifestation of this 
requirement. The Chinese government has regularly used the People’s 
Liberation Army in times of major floods, for instance, both in the 
construction of defences against river overflows, or in the disbursement of 
much-needed relief supplies. What is fairly new, however, is the 
deployment of military organisations to other countries who have suffered 
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natural disasters – witness the global relief efforts that came in the wake of 
the December 2005 tsunami that affected parts of Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand and India. 
 
Where does the RMA fit within the spectrum of humanitarian and disaster 
relief operations? It is possible that these humanitarian relief operations 
present challenges that run against the grain of the skill sets that military 
organisations have traditionally focused on – namely in conventional 
military operations in defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the state, or in conventional campaigns projected into distant theatres of 
operations in pursuit of the interests of the state concerned. If nothing else, 
it is necessary to ask where and how (if at all) the RMA fits with 
humanitarian and disaster relief missions. The Singapore experience in the 
December 2005 tsunami disaster relief operations appears at first glance to 
refute this argument concerning specialised non-traditional training.44 The 
Singapore Armed Forces has spent its entire history preparing for one 
campaign scenario – the projection of military power into Malaysia to 
secure water supplies against radical elements that have taken over power 
and cut off water supplies to the island republic. Its force structure reflects 
the operational need to project power into Malaysian territory, a very 
traditional security concern. The irony was that this conventional power 
projection capacity was utilised in a non-traditional mission – airlift assets 
like C-130s and Fokker-50 and CH-47 helicopters moved 1200 military 
personnel with over one million tons of cargo over some 250 sorties,45 
while heavy sealift assets moved engineering equipment such as 
bulldozers, excavators and cranes to establish beach landing points and 
clear supply routes from the coast to the devastated areas – to respond 
rapidly to the growing crisis in Banda Aceh. 
 
Official pronouncements portrayed this operation as a success, but 
interestingly, the Singapore Armed Forces subsequently identified its 21st 
Division as the specialist agency for future similar missions. This act might 
constitute tacit recognition of the need for specialised training, and at least 
present weak evidence that the performance of the Singapore Armed 
Forces in Banda Aceh was less than completely successful. The point to 
note is that soldiers not trained for such missions will likely find ‘learning 
on the job’ at best a difficult experience, and certainly a less-than-ideal 
situation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that given the conscription 
base of the Singapore Armed Forces, a two-year length of active duty may 
be sufficient to prepare a military organisation to take on either traditional 
conventional military operations or the new security roles outlined above; 
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this time frame, however, may not allow the military organisation to 
adequately prepare for both. 
 
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 
Military transformation ala the RMA is a necessarily difficult process; for 
small and middle powers, it is even worse, given the resource constraints 
that become even starker for these states. To ignore transformation, 
however, may not possible, if only because one has to keep within touching 
distance of technological changes. To embrace transformation, however, is 
not guarantee of maintaining extant military standards and position either. 
It requires a leap of faith, because the small or middle power is embarking 
on a journey in which there are no clear road maps that can guide policy-
making. Not surprisingly, there remains some residual doubt as to whether 
or not the RMA is a path that has to be taken. Within Southeast Asia, some 
states have come to the conclusion that the RMA – manifested in the 
military transformation agenda of the United States military – is not the 
policy option for their conditions and circumstances. 
 
As this study has suggested, the reasons for this reticence in embracing the 
RMA and military transformation come in part from the uncertainty as to 
what this RMA actually does for and to military organisations. In other 
words, what does a transformed military actually look like? How does it 
function in war? How does the RMA guarantee strategic success? These 
are difficult questions, and questions that the existing RMA literature has 
done little to provide convincing explanations and answers to. Is a 
transformed military organisation simply a more efficient killing machine 
than its predecessor, or should we expect a transformed military to operate 
in fundamentally different styles? Furthermore, as this study has tried to 
show, there may be some disjuncture between what the RMA promises to 
give to military organisations in terms of capabilities, and the likely 
operational scenarios that military organisations face. Assuming that more 
and more military organisations expect to be deployed in these so-called 
non-traditional missions and roles, how useful is this RMA? The answers 
remain elusive at best. Consequently, given the limited resources that small 
and medium powers have, it might be a more prudent approach to ‘wait and 
see’ – to allow these technologies to become mature, before making any 
decision on whether or not to embrace this phenomenon. 
 
How then does this study explain the transformation agendas of not so 
much the United States military, but the military organisations of small and 
medium powers such as Singapore? In the case of Singapore, the answer to 
this question lies in the assumption that technological leaps do occur on 
occasions, and it is imperative that the military organisation remain as close 
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to the leading edge of technological development as economically possible 
and prudent. We already have at least one historical example of the 
disastrous consequences of taking great technological leaps to try to catch 
up with the leading edge – China’s ill-starred Great Leap Forward in the 
1950s. In this case, the motto was “Two Steps Forward, One Step 
Backward”, but the reality was more likely “Two Steps Backward”. It 
would appear that in the case of Singapore, its defence planners and policy 
makers came to the conclusion that the Singapore Armed Forces can ill-
afford to take a Great Leap Forward later on, and that it therefore had as 
much as possible to keep pace with the technological leading edge. 
 
Nevertheless, the questions that this study has posed apply equally to the 
Singapore Armed Forces: can the Singapore Armed Forces be ready for it, 
what of the RMA is essential, affordable and operationable, and does the 
organisation have the right systems that can maximise the impact of these 
new technologies on the organisation’s combat effectiveness? This 
transformation process requires as its cutting edge the employment of 
extremely expensive high-end precision-guided munitions. The 
organisation recognises that this is uncharted territory, and that it is making 
up the rules of the game as it goes along. On the plus side, Singapore has 
developed a reasonably credible military industrial complex that has at 
least on paper designed weapons systems and capabilities specific to 
Singapore’s unique conditions. Furthermore, the Singapore Armed Forces 
has a fairly mature conventional military capability and at least a nascent 
joint warfare capability that allows it to make the transformation to new 
types of warfare relatively painless. The SAF has also put in place a 
strategic concept that can theoretically leverage on the national advantages 
of a well-educated populace, computer literacy, and relatively high levels 
of technological expertise. Furthermore, there are signs that the 
organisation is beginning to rethink its operational structures. Whether the 
Singapore Armed Forces will emerge from this experiment with its 
capacity to remain relevant to the strategic demands of the state – whether 
in conventional defence of the island to the ever-increasing range of 
operations other than war – remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile speculating that the Singapore Armed Forces may have to 
make difficult choices. If the experience of the Singapore Armed Forces is 
of any applicability to other small military organisations, it may be this: 
small military organisations cannot have its cake (conventional military 
capabilities) and eat it (new security roles) too. 
 
Bernard Loo is an Assistant Professor at the Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.  
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Future Demands on the Armed Forces – A UK Perspective 
Caroline Robson 
UK Ministry of Defence 
 
 
This article gives a flavour of the way in which the UK Armed Forces are 
looking at their future role and the evolution of the policy supporting the 
adaptation of force structure and outlook. Set in the context of a changing 
global security environment, it covers the various issues informing the 
development of the next iteration of the MoD’s Defence Strategic 
Guidance, due to be issued in 2008. This is reviewed broadly biennially 
and provides direction to the planners when determining the capabilities 
needed to meet the demands of current and future threats.  
 
 
The Changing Role of Defence 
 
In 1998, the UK’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was undertaken at the 
request of the new Labour Government. This was foreign policy led and 
involved a complete study of the UK’s defence and security needs. The 
SDR identified the major challenges and, based on an updated set of 
detailed planning assumptions, set the criteria against which the UK Armed 
Forces must deliver. The SDR also produced an enduring Defence Aim, 
which is to deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the 
Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to 
act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability. 
The Defence Aim represents the core task of the MoD and the Armed 
Forces and is the starting point when considering which tasks the Armed 
Forces should and should not undertake.  
 
The phrase “including against terrorism’ was added in 2002 when a New 
Chapter was written for the SDR. While the New Chapter was added in 
light of the events of 11 September 2001 and the accompanying shift in the 
emphasis of global security threats, it did not represent a sudden awakening 
to the realities of terrorism; instead, it recognised that the nature of 
terrorism had changed. The UK had for decades experienced the impact of 
Irish terrorism but the violence was in the context of a predominantly 
territorial dispute. This was always an internal problem for the UK but the 
principal contemporary terrorist threat now comes from an ideology, which 
on the macroscopic scale is not tied to specific borders. The problem has 
become international in nature and, due to ever-increasing globalisation, is 
likely to remain so.  
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Along with the international terrorist threat, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the risks associated with failed and failing states are 
high on the agenda of enduring threats. In recent years it has become 
increasingly clear that organised crime also has a large part to play in the 
increased security risk to the UK. Where it fits in with other Defence tasks, 
the MoD and the Armed Forces are able to play their part, for example in 
the interdiction of drug shipments during the Royal Navy’s routine patrols 
of the Caribbean. Owing to ease of travel and advances in the field of 
instant communications, organised crime is increasingly becoming a cross-
border problem. Failed and failing states are a particular problem in this 
respect because ungoverned spaces, especially in post-conflict situations 
where a lack of law and order prevails, provide ideal conditions for 
criminal groups to flourish. Organised crime provides a source of finance 
for terrorism, which when combined with weapons proliferation creates an 
increased threat to the UK. The counter narcotics campaign of the Afghan 
Government is supported by the UK through its MoD and Armed Forces 
and has a direct link to the security of both nations.  
 
 
Emerging Threats 
 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the UK enjoyed a period of relative 
domestic security throughout the 1990s. Along with many of its European 
neighbours, it reduced the size of its standing armed forces as the threat of 
conflict between the superpowers receded. However the post Cold War era, 
which has been defined by a single dominant superpower in the shape of 
the United States, is now changing fast, notably with the rise in influence of 
China and India. This increase in geopolitical complexity may ultimately 
make disputes more difficult to resolve between multiple large 
stakeholders. Technological advance is presenting new challenges 
involving both state and non-state actors and the traditional advantage of 
the western Armed Forces is being eroded. The dependence on states at risk 
of instability for energy resources has also led many countries to place a 
renewed importance upon energy security. The UK will be nearly 80% 
dependent upon imported energy by 2010 and so this issue is growing in 
importance. The future may see the Armed Forces playing more of a role in 
energy security as resources become scarce. A rising global population, 
predicted to reach nine billion by 2050, will fuel competition for water, 
food, land and energy and may lead to large-scale migration. Adding to this 
the potential influence of climate change, resource conflicts that exacerbate 
existing political, ethnic and religious tensions are increasingly likely.   
 
A great deal of uncertainty results from the speed at which these powerful 
global trends are developing and there is no guarantee that current 
assumptions will remain valid. The way in which these trends will interact 
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and introduce vulnerabilities into the international system remains highly 
unpredictable, leaving political or economic disruption in one part of the 
world liable to affect the entire global community.  
 
 
An International Role 
 
Globalisation has brought many benefits and opportunities and the UK has 
built upon its traditional range of overseas interests including trade, 
investment and continued access to natural resources. This expansion of 
horizons has also brought with it increased security risks such as the wide 
availability of advanced weapons technology and reliance upon modern 
electronic communications systems. The success of the UK is dependent on 
the success of other nations and, as a result, stability in other parts of the 
world translates into a safer security climate at home and vice versa. The 
UK sees the maintenance of international defence relationships as a key 
part of the effort to combat both existing and emerging threats as the issues 
facing the UK are similar in nature to those faced by many of its friends 
and allies. The security of Europe and investment in the transatlantic 
relationship remain key issues. It is an important part of the UK’s security 
policy to remain capable of delivering effective military force alongside 
EU and NATO allies, both in peace support and intervention operations. As 
such, the UK is a leading military contributor to NATO and the EU’s 
European Security and Defence Policy as well as retaining a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council. As a member of an international 
community prepared to deal with a range of security challenges, the UK 
continues to be able to pursue its own interests and exert influence in the 
changing geopolitical climate. Strong alliances and partnerships are critical 
in ensuring the UK’s future security needs are met. In the transatlantic 
forum, NATO remains the organisation with the greatest capacity to 
respond to global problems as they arise. Development of the military 
capabilities of the EU will assist Europe in maintaining its collective 
influence on the world stage and enable its component nations to better 
fulfil their roles in the security of the international community. 
 
 
Investing in the Armed Forces 
 
The Armed Forces must evolve with the growing security challenges in 
order to maintain the UK’s influence as a global player and to provide a 
degree of insurance against future threats. The need to meet the challenge 
of more frequent, more agile overseas deployments has meant a move away 
from heavily armoured forces towards light and medium weight long range 
capabilities and a balanced force structure prepared for a range of tasks 
from hard end war fighting to humanitarian relief. Significant investment 
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has gone into long distance bulk transport including Boeing C-17s, of 
which the UK has four on lease and a fifth on order. Roll-on-roll-off 
shipping is also leased as required in order to transport equipment to and 
from theatres of operations. Investment in light armoured vehicles has also 
become a priority as they can be deployed more quickly than heavier 
variants, often by air. The UK has invested in a helicopter carrier – HMS 
Ocean – and two new Landing Platform Docks, amphibious assault 
platforms that enable improved flexibility and the exploitation of littoral 
environments. The Army has restructured in order to maximise the number 
of infantry battalions available for deployment at any one time and in 
addition the Special Forces have been expanded in response to the terrorist 
threat. The ability to collect and exploit intelligence is vital in light of the 
increased threat of being engaged asymmetrically. The need to 
communicate quickly and effectively and for the systems in a particular 
battle arena to work in synergy has led to a large investment in Network 
Enabled Capabilities and modern communications packages. Standoff 
capabilities such as Predator are also seeing increased utility.   
 
Delivering such a range and balance of outputs is expensive and has 
required the implementation of a rigorous efficiency programme. The 
Defence Budget has increased over the past decade by about 8% in real 
terms and additional money has also been sourced from the Treasury for 
many operational requirements. This has permitted the much-needed 
investment in equipment and personnel to date and has enabled the Armed 
Forces to deliver the UK’s current policy. 
 
 
The Comprehensive Approach 
 
The Armed Forces are one part of the government’s ‘toolkit’ and 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven how important it is to fuse 
military capability with the civilian reconstruction efforts that deliver 
sustainable stability. The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was 
set up in 2004 to achieve this aim. Consisting of personnel from the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the MoD and the Department for 
International Development, the PCRU is focused on stabilising post-
conflict environments quickly in order that development activities can be 
undertaken, reducing the need for further military intervention. The 
security context in which civilian development workers may be required to 
operate is often challenging, particularly in the immediate aftermath of 
hostilities. The MoD is currently working with colleagues across 
government to identify the best way for the Armed Forces to enable 
civilian agencies to deliver reconstruction. 
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Developing Future Policy 
 
Various themes are shaping the UK’s current defence planning and 
strategic thinking. These will inform decisions on the capabilities and 
resulting force structure needed to meet the challenges. This article does 
not seek to offer a definitive response to these themes, but articulates a 
number of the areas, which are drawing attention from our strategic 
planners. Aside from the issue of whether to invest in a greater ability to 
carry out reconstruction activities, there is the question of whether Defence 
should invest more in conflict prevention. This is particularly important in 
the case of strategic state failure, where a targeted cross-government 
response may be able to stop the failure from occurring. A world in which 
weapons are increasingly available to opponents brings into question the 
potential vulnerabilities of the Armed Forces and the future impact on the 
UK’s freedom to protect its interests. The Armed Forces need to meet the 
challenge of weapon proliferation and continue to deliver upon government 
objectives. Analysis is currently being undertaken into whether there is a 
contribution for Defence in the realm of energy security; a small number of 
states control the vast majority of the Earth’s energy resources and may in 
future wish to use access to supply as a means of leverage. 
 
It is clear from recent experience that the UK is unlikely to conduct future 
operations alone, preferring instead to deploy as part of a larger coalition. 
This will ideally be within the framework of a multinational institution 
such as the UN, NATO or EU, where the full spectrum of capabilities and 
manpower can be utilised to best effect. The challenge for the UK then 
becomes how to develop the way that existing multilateral organisations 
function and interact in order to maintain the agility required to meet a 
variety of threats.  
 
In a competitive labour market, human resource issues may become an 
increasing challenge. The ageing population has meant a relative reduction 
in the number of individuals of military age and, coupled with enduring 
deployments and the uncertain security environment, the result may mean 
difficulties in the recruitment and retention of suitably qualified and able 
personnel. Defence relies upon its people and shortfalls in key areas could 
affect the ability of the Armed Forces to carry out UK objectives. 
 
Finally, with the rising use of asymmetric tactics and information 
operations against the Armed Forces, the UK must contemplate how it can 
compete in the ‘war of ideas’ to win the support of those it aims to assist. 
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Conclusion 
 
In developing its Defence strategy, the UK has worked to create a balanced 
force structure capable of undertaking operations throughout the world in a 
variety of different roles. The pressures of globalisation and a rapidly 
evolving security climate continue to present challenges, to which the UK 
must rise in order to deliver security for its people. The role of the Armed 
Forces may expand as the security threats become more complex but the 
UK will continue to forward plan carefully in order to make the best use of 
resources and, together with her allies, will meet new challenges and 
undertake her responsibility to act as a force for good in the world. 
 
Caroline Robson is the UK Ministry of Defence’s Policy and Defence 
Relations Desk Officer for the Nordic Countries and Ireland. 
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Armed Forces’ Roles and Capabilities 2020: Reflections from 
the Suomenlinna Groupwork Sessions 
Tommi Koivula and Jyrki Helminen 
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University 
of Finland  
 
 
Aims and Method 
 
How should the industrialised nations’ armed forces prepare to meet the 
threats and demands of tomorrow? 
 
This very profound question served as the starting point for the tenth 
Suomenlinna Seminar, organised by the Department for Strategic and 
Defence Studies (DSDS) of the National Defence University of Finland in 
Helsinki on May 30th and 31st, 2007. The idea was to celebrate the occasion 
of the tenth annual Suomenlinna seminar by organising a gathering of 
experts, seeking to provide insights into the possible ways to adapt not just 
Finnish or European but in more general terms industrialised nations’ 
military resources to today’s and tomorrow’s changing security 
environment.  
 
This article is an attempt to sum up some of the major findings of the two-
day workshop that took place during the seminar, concentrating on this 
issue. 
 
Providing insights about future tasks and missions of the industrialised 
nations’ armed forces was indeed the impetus and rationale for the seminar. 
Therefore, from the onset of the seminar planning, it was deemed valuable 
that the programme would combine groupwork method along with the 
more traditional approach of prepared speaker presentations, providing 
thereby an opportunity to draw on the knowledge and expertise of the 
seminar’s limited but qualified group of participants. After all, the seminar 
was joined by 60 plus selected invitees and speakers from 14 countries, 
representing both civilian and military fields with persons from various 
academic, diplomatic and governmental positions, as well as professionals 
from the media, business community, students etc., all having interest in 
the security issues as their common denominator.  
 
To materialise the seminar emphasis to groupwork and brainstorming, five 
working groups were formed. They were scheduled to gather during both 
seminar days so that group elaboration would alternate with prepared 
speaker presentations and that the former would thereby receive inspiration 
and fresh ideas from the latter. In a totally undemocratic fashion, the 
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groups were formed randomly beforehand by the DSDS staff from the 
registered participants, so that each participant had an assigned working 
group once the seminar began. In line with this undemocratic principle, 
each group was assigned a chairperson and a supporting person, the latter 
being usually a junior member of Department for Strategic and Defence 
Studies.  
 
The task of the working groups was simple but somewhat unspecified. 
Each group was asked to fill in a simple diagram with two sets of lines 
(please, see the diagram below): first, to describe the issue-areas or 
qualities that are being emphasised by the armed forces of modern 
industrialised nations of our time (year 2007) and second, to describe the 
areas that should be emphasised by these armed forces by the year 2020. 
Thus, the task included a conscious normative emphasis: instead of trying 
to describe or forecast the future, the groups were asked to make 
recommendations based on their understanding.  
 
While given the liberty to be creative, the groups were asked to name at 
least three military capabilities and at least three roles for the armed forces 
that has been and/or should be emphasised (please, see these definitions 
below).1 In addition, the groups were asked to name additional roles, 
capabilities or some other qualities that they saw as important.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Military capability refers to the ability to achieve a desired effect in a given operating 
environment. Typical military capabilities include deployability of armed forces, their 
interoperability, or fighting power of the forces; in more precise terms, military 
capabilities can be special operations forces, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) 
protection capabilities, strategic air and sea lift capabilities etc. Roles of the military 
refer to the perceived missions of the armed forces, for instance homeland defence, 
expeditionary role, emphasis on crisis management, assistance to other authorities 
within a society etc. 
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Illustrative Example: one way to interpret change in the western armed 
forces between 2007 (in dotted line) and 2020 in certain key dimensions 
 
(The closer the lines are to the arrows of the diagram, the more a given 
quality is being emphasised. The closer to centre the line is, the less) 
 
 Fighting power per unit 
Generality 
Quantity 
Integration Internationality 
 
Tool for societal good 
Crisis Management 
(PSO) 
Deployability 
 
In addition to filling the diagram and equally important, the groups were 
also asked to elaborate conclusions based on the emerging diagram for the 
year 2020: for example, what did a certain emphasis mean in concrete 
terms, what practical steps ought to have been taken, what were the main 
difficulties or positive and negative effects of chosen directions, to what 
extent these goals were to be met with national resources etc. Even though 
no official notes were made, this wider elaboration was closely followed by 
the supporting staff and then reported to the authors of this article.  
 
Finally, having concluded the two-day groupwork, each group chairman 
presented their respective group’s diagrams in the concluding session of the 
seminar.  
 
As such, one can find certain similarities between the above approach and 
the so-called Delphi method, in which experts gather to systematically 
discuss a certain issue-area in order to obtain forecasts about it. Even 
though Delphi was by no means an official starting point or procedure at 
Suomenlinna Seminar, we also sought to enable reliable and creative 
exploration of ideas and tried to facilitate the formation of a group 
judgement among the participants. Yet, the amount of expertise among the 
participants is only applicable to the extent that the groupwork format has 
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been able to materialise it. Therefore, the seminar findings below will be 
followed by further elaboration, discussing the significance of these 
findings as well as the benefits and limitations of the method applied.  
 
The heterogeneity of seminar participants ensured that the discussions and 
the results were just as diverse as one can imagine. In order to find 
common ground and for the sake of practicality the emphasis of this article 
is on similarities rather than differences: we try to highlight the most 
popular and commonly agreed visions of the future rather than the 
multitude of various responses given, which of course would have been a 
most interesting exercise as such. However, when the workshop findings 
were put together, certain capabilities and roles clearly stood up between 
various groups and a number of common perceptions could be found.2  
 
Bearing in mind these starting points and limitations it is now time to turn 
to actual findings of the groupworks: that is, how did the participants see 
the emerging threat environment until 2020 and  what qualities should we 
develop in the industrialised nations’ armed forces in order to better meet 
the threats and demands of tomorrow? 
 
 
Defining Future Threats: Smaller, Faster and More Complex 
 
Threats are at the core of military thinking. As it was stated in several 
group discussions, the presence of threats both legitimizes the existence of 
the armed forces and motivates their development. All the groups agreed in 
the beginning that to be able to define the future armed forces capabilities 
and roles, it is necessary to start by contemplating the nature of future 
threats, which these capabilities and roles are intended to respond. 
 
Much was discussed about the difficulties of describing the future threats. 
Participants pointed out the question as to what extent the current threats 
affect our definitions of the future ones. The generally plausible conclusion 
was that future threats tend more or less always to be compromises 
between contemporary and probable emerging future threats.  
 
Based on group discussions, new security challenges and threats have 
emerged beside the traditional ones. Workshop participants named long list 
of potential future threats starting from quite traditional ones like organized 
crime and arms race and ending to environmental (both climate change and 
pollution), cyber threat and terrorism. 
 
                                                 
2 However, a few occasional exemptions will be made in the article, in which particular 
arguments offer important contribution or controversial views. 
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Not surprisingly, it was generally acknowledged that future threats vary 
greatly and are increasingly difficult to define. Still, summing up all the 
group opinions, the most prominent future threats were deemed to be 
terrorism, international or regional crisis, internal instability, info war or 
cyber threat and the problem of simply identifying the enemy. In addition, 
the more conventional issues of arms race and weapons of mass destruction 
were generally stated to pose a serious threat also in the future.  
 
Terrorism was stated in every group as a continuing future threat. 
Participants noted that the most alarming problem in the acts of terrorism is 
that they can occur anywhere and therefore increase the general feeling of 
insecurity. Some of the groups expressed quite sceptical views of the 
contemporary “war on terror” and argued that societies should concentrate 
more on influencing on the causes of terrorism than just responding to the 
effects. In addition, some concerns were expressed about the questions of 
how power of defining terrorism or terrorists can be abused within a 
society.  
 
International crisis was the most versatile concept of the future threats, 
covering a large range of issues from peace operations to humanitarian and 
disaster relief operations, humanitarian interventions etc. Internal 
instability was stated in the groups to be a growing source of threats. The 
explanations that appeared in the discussions concentrated mainly on 
growing urbanization (crime and violence), demographic phenomena, 
radicalization and alienation. As Raimo Väyrynen puts it, despite the fact 
that wars and conflicts have statistically decreased in numbers, internal 
violence (or microviolence) remains high within many societies.3  
 
Info-war or cyber threat was addressed to be one of the most growing 
potential future threats. It was stated by the workshop participants that the 
global revolution of the information technology has both made societies 
more vulnerable and made it easier for the enemy to acquire sufficient 
hardware to commence cyber attacks.4 Concern was expressed about the 
uncertain capabilities of the modern society to defend itself, for instance 
critical navigation and communication satellites, against info-war. 
 
The difficulty of identifying the enemy surfaced as an individual threat in 
almost every group. As it is stated above, especially terrorism and other 
vague sources of threats like humanitarian and environmental disasters 
have increased the difficulties of making clear and accurate threat 
assessments. Difficulties in making clear assessments tend easily to 
                                                 
3 See Raimo Väyrynen’s article in this volume. 
4 See also Bernard Loo’s article in this volume where he also emphasizes the 
contradictory effects of the IT-revolution, describing it as “a double-edged sword.” 
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increase general insecurity in societies. Potential threats have advanced 
from clearly defined lines and borders to inside the cities and “among us”. 
Related to this issue, workshop participants emphasized the growing 
importance of the question about who is defining the threats and enemies. 
The potentially problematic outcome from this is that the fuzzier the threats 
are the greater power there is to be used or abused when defining them. 
 
Thus, the threat spectrum, or at least the discourse on threats has expanded 
to cover an ever-increasing degree of non-traditional, semi- or non-military 
phenomena, which would suggest that future armed forces should have new 
roles and more comprehensive capabilities to be able to respond to these 
challenges.5 In addition, to be able to perform military missions, future 
armed forces are also required being able to carry out more non-military 
missions where their role would be more assisting and supportive in nature 
than offensive. 
 
Thus, future threats seem to be more about crises, both internal and 
external, than invasions. If tomorrow’s threats can be shortly described, one 
could say that they are getting smaller, faster and more complex. They also 
affect civilian society to an increasing amount and tend to be more 
humanitarian than military by nature. In growing numbers the management 
of these crises includes cooperation with civilian authorities, NGOs and 
local actors in supporting the civilians, rebuilding both hard and soft 
infrastructures6, mediating in a conflict and building peace and stability 
among the local people. These tasks require a totally new kind of 
deployability, flexibility and interoperability capabilities from the armed 
forces. They also require extensive cultural knowledge and language skills, 
thereby increasing the demands for training of future troops. 
 
 
Roles: Humanitarian Relief, Internal Crisis Management - and 
Homeland Defence 
 
To be able to respond to the threats stated above, workshop groups 
concluded that crucial future roles should be humanitarian relief and 
support of the civiliansm internal crisis management and homeland 
defence.  
 
 
                                                 
5 For a wider discussion, see articles by Robert Dalsjö, Bernard Loo, Anja Dalgaard-
Nielsen and Caroline Robson in this volume about the new threats, roles and demands 
of the armed forces.  
6 Here, hard infrastructure is defined as roads, electricity etc. and soft infrastructure as 
governmental institution etc.  
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Workshop conclusions highlighted humanitarian relief and support of the 
civilians as another key role for the future armed forces. Practically all the 
groups stated clearly that it is generally expected that armed forces will be 
involved increasingly in different humanitarian missions. These missions 
can vary from humanitarian intervention to natural disaster relief and from 
stabilizing failed states to reconstructing national institutions. At the core of 
all these missions lays the fundamental and generally emphasized objective 
to produce humanitarian relief by providing both protection and assistance 
to the civilians.7 
 
Basically, it was widely agreed among the groups that if and when 
traditional threats are decreasing the armed forces resources should be then 
concentrated more on humanitarian missions and to help poorer countries 
in general. However, the question of how to draw the line between 
peacekeeping missions and state interventions was presented during the 
seminar, raising some discussion about this key problem. The issue was 
highlighted by Raimo Väyrynen’s observation is his seminar presentation 
as he pointed out that even that the amount of the humanitarian 
interventions has increased by numbers there is still no established practice 
to execute them.8 Concern was expressed about the legitimacy of the state 
interventions because United Nations Security Council, as sole authority to 
legitimate them, has been bypassed i.e. in a number of recent interventions, 
most notably the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the invasion in Iraq in 2003. 
 
It was noted that international crises are increasingly having wider effects 
and involving increasing number of countries, due to the alliances and 
globalization. The environment is causing growing amounts of 
humanitarian suffering in wide areas because of the apparent climate 
change and man-made pollution. Therefore, as it was stated in the groups, 
resources of the armed forces should be redirected to confront these non-
military global threats. 
 
According to the collective opinion of the working group participants, 
internal or domestic crisis management can be regarded as the third main 
future role of the armed forces. 
 
A growing need to direct armed forces to domestic crisis management, 
whether in the form of disaster relief or fighting against terrorism, requires 
intensified cooperation between civilian and military authorities and 
thereby again new capabilities from the armed forces.9 Armed forces 
                                                 
7 See previous footnotes about the new roles of the armed forces mentioned by the 
contributors of this publication.  
8 See Raimo Väyrynen’s article in this volume. 
9 Somewhat contradictory example is presented by Bernard Loo in his article, where he 
describes the experiences of the Singapore Armed Forces in participating December 
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should remember to inform also the civilian authorities of the potential 
threats because they are most likely responsible of the first hand rescue 
services.  
 
In the context of the internal crisis management, the question as to how to 
determine what is internal and what is external security came to the fore on 
several occasions. Distinguishing one from the other is becoming 
increasingly difficult due the changing nature of the crisis and threats. As 
described in the Homeland defence chapter above, the concept of internal 
or national territory is expanding, incorporating new threats inside it to be 
responded.  
 
Perhaps slightly surprisingly, homeland defence remains at the core of 
future armed forces roles according to a substantial number of groupwork 
participants. Yet, a common understanding seems to be that a conventional 
threat of armed invasion has had a new set of threats by its side. It was also 
noted that territorial defence has always been the traditional role of armed 
forces and that military traditions are known to change slowly. A telling 
example to highlight this observation is the fact pointed put by some 
workshop participants that there are still circa two million soldiers in the 
EU nations’ armed forces.   
 
Interesting line of discussion surfaced in many of the groups about the 
definition of homeland. It was stated that intensifying alliances and 
coalitions are making it increasing difficulties to define where exactly lays 
the political and contractual borders of “homeland”. Already among the 
European Union member states the definition “European homeland” is 
preferred politically if not practically, and the development of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy is only intensifying and manifesting this trend.  
 
Most of the groups concluded that the definition of homeland is developing 
towards the concept of extended homeland also in a more general sense. 
This is due to both the alliance commitments and the ongoing regional 
integration processes throughout the industrialised world. Nation states are 
becoming increasingly interdependent, perhaps decreasing the amount of 
conflicts but simultaneously making emergent regional conflicts more apt 
to escalate.10  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
2005 tsunami disaster relief operation in which SAF deployed successfully conventional 
military capacity in a non-traditional mission.  
10 It was also noted that discussion about the extended homeland defence is connected 
to the increasing intelligence capabilities, enabling earlier threat assessments and 
producing the possibility to intervene threats at an early stage, possibly in the area of 
their origin. 
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Capabilities: Confronting Threats Beyond National Territory 
 
If homeland defence, humanitarian relief and internal crisis management 
were deemed to be the most popular roles for tomorrow’s armed forces, the 
most commonly stated future capabilities were judged as expeditionary 
missions, intelligence and information operations, civilian-military 
cooperation and force protection.  
 
It was generally stated in the groups that future threats demand increasing 
expeditionary capabilities, that is, an ability to rapidly move forces on the 
areas of crisis. Furthermore, it is required that forces are able to maintain 
their operational capabilities for an extensive period of time in all possible 
conditions and situations. Many participants emphasised the importance of 
confronting crises already in their area of origin and the increasing 
importance of preventing the crisis from escalating with such rapid action. 
 
It was commonly acknowledged that armed forces are in growing numbers 
participating in different kinds of relief operations side by side with the 
civilian authorities. Frequent environmental and humanitarian disasters, 
fight against terrorism and varying alliances obligations are all contributing 
to the need that national armed forces should further develop the 
deployability and expeditionary operational capabilities.  
 
Another commonly emphasized and logically connected future capability 
was the area of intelligence and information operations. The ability to 
respond to the future threats and particularly to be able to define them and 
the prospective enemies requires enhanced intelligence capabilities. These 
capabilities in broader context were referred in some groups by using the 
military jargon term C4ISR as Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Intelligence and 
information capability becomes a necessity also since there is a need to 
respond to growing threat of cyber attacks and other threats involving 
revolutionized information technology. These Info Ops in military jargon 
can be used as a synonym for wide variety of military operations covering 
everything from electronic warfare to computer network operations and 
psychological operations. It was generally noted, as described above, that 
revolution in information technology has created a totally new field of 
threats, which can be created practically by anyone possessing sufficient 
expertise and technical equipment, both of which are already today freely 
available for consumers. To further emphasize the significance of this 
capability, a common agreement seemed to exist among the participants 
that electronical warfare is already reality and would be very likely utilised 
in any major future conflict.  
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As stated before, workshop participants’ future threat perceptions indicate a 
clear move towards non-conventional multi-task missions involving 
civilian-military cooperation, such as peace operations, humanitarian and 
disaster relief, reconstruction, substitute for the civilian administration of a 
failed state, and counter-terrorism. It was commonly concluded by the 
groups that these new tasks would require a more comprehensive approach, 
which should include intensifying cooperation with the civilian authorities. 
 
The general understanding seems to be that conflicts are increasingly 
difficult to solve by using conventional armed forces because conflicts are 
more and more located in urban terrain and involve an ever increasing 
amount of civilians as well as various civilian actors. Therefore, there is a 
need to enhance civilian-military cooperation and develop combined 
approaches to meet these crises.11 On the other hand, as Caroline Robson 
has pointed out in her article, the security context in which civilian 
development workers and other actors may be required to operate is often 
challenging, particularly in the immediate aftermath of hostilities, thereby 
increasing the need for armed protection provided by the military.12   
 
Concerns were expressed about the so-called “stovepipe” structure, which 
has traditionally separated the military and civilian operations. This 
division was now considered to be obsolete, since, as it was pointed out, 
both the increasing technicality of the military systems and non-military 
missions create higher demand of skilled professionals. Therefore, 
arguments on behalf of more open cooperation between the army and the 
civilian authorities were widely expressed.13  In addition, more attention 
should be paid on recruiting and the possibilities of moving personnel 
between civilian and military assignments – a practice called “hop in –hop 
out” service, should be made easier.  
 
It was pointed out in many of the groups that armed forces weapon systems 
are becoming increasingly technical and therefore more vulnerable. The 
increasing technicality is making weapon system platforms more expensive 
and is also creating a need for highly trained professionals to work as 
system operators. Therefore, armies are likely to get smaller.  
 
It was generally agreed that all these factors: increasing high-tech, 
dependence on professionals and decreasing amount of system units, are 
increasing the armed forces vulnerability. Therefore, it was generally 
                                                 
11 See articles by Robert Dalsjö, Anu Laamanen, Bernard Loo, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen 
and Caroline Robson in this volume about the need of Civilian-Military Cooperation. 
12 See article by Caroline Robson in this volume. 
13 This point is being further discussed by Jørgen Berggrav in his article.  
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recognized that force protection should be another crucial capability for the 
future armed forces.14 
 
 
Debate on Hard Reforms 
 
Having defined the required future armed forces roles and capabilities the 
essential question of how they can be reached surfaced in some of the 
groups. Both workshop participants and several seminar speakers held that 
responding to future threats and executing future military roles and 
capabilities will require significant changes in the conventional armed 
forces. 
 
At the core of this transformation is the question how the armed forces can 
execute these roles and reach these capabilities. It was generally 
acknowledged in the groups that there is increasing need of specialised 
forces, e.g. military police to secure order and engineers to reconstruct 
infrastructure. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to increase the number 
of these troops and develop the military training to better respond 
humanitarian missions. However, considerably many participants held at 
the same time that there is still need to maintain conventional fighting 
capacity required e.g. in homeland defence. Therefore, the question is 
about appropriate ways to finance these needs. Are these new qualities to 
be developed simultaneously with conventional troops or should the 
amount of conventional troops be reduced? The previous option would 
require increasing the defence budgets and the latter would pose a potential 
risk of deterioration of the operational foundation of the armed forces.  
 
Keeping the previous arguments in mind, some of the participants argued 
that reforms could be accomplished by integrating all these requirements 
together and developing the armed forces as a whole in the way that it 
would be able to have a comprehensive approach to future’s complex set of 
crises. 
 
Characteristically, a debate surfaced in one of the groups about the 
respective benefits of general conscription versus professional armies. 
There was clear division between different nationalities in support of 
general compulsory military service, limited conscription or professional 
army. The Finns, Estonians and Russians were unanimously supporting 
general compulsory military service whereas the British, Swedish and 
                                                 
14 In his article Bernard Loo defines the development described above as a sort of 
structural disarmament. This can be explained by the fact that when weapon systems are 
getting more expensive, at least the small countries with limited defence budgets are 
forced to concentrate on fewer highly developed, manoeuvrable and effective systems. 
See Bernard Loo’s article in this volume. 
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French participants supported either a more limited conscription or a totally 
professional army. The latter group contended that professional armies 
would further the development of peace in crisis management operations 
because the troops would be better trained and therefore more capable to 
respond to varying demands. The main argument of the previous group on 
the other hand was that general conscription is making it possible to benefit 
of the conscripts’ civilian expertise which was argued to be a substantial 
asset for example in the reconstruction operations.  
 
It was also noted in one of the groups that societies rarely have resources to 
participate in multiple crises and to act in a wide range of roles, so that the 
importance of prioritising is increasing. Nations are therefore most likely 
compelled to choose the areas of operations and missions they are 
focusing.15   
 
Still, the importance of the traditional troops and the limitations of the 
high-tech arms systems were acknowledged during the seminar by referring 
to the experiences gained from the recent conflicts in the Balkans and in 
Lebanon. The experiences from those crises illustrated that objectives 
could not be reached only by using air bombings or precision weapons. 
Missions were accomplished only by deploying traditional ground troops. 
 
 
Where Should We Be Heading?   
 
It is evident that a task with such a wide range of possible directions 
produced a multitude of responses in the working groups. Therefore, the 
above findings should be regarded as a summing-up of the most frequently 
held opinions. However, they do not provide a logical guideline, which 
ought to be followed as such. At the same time, it is evident that the above 
outcome can be subjected to limitations and critical evaluation due to 
factors related to seminar setting and arrangements.  
 
Rather, what these groupwork conclusions provide us is an overall picture 
of the international threat environment and of the direction into which we 
should proceed in developing tomorrow’s armed forces. 
 
All in all, as we study the findings of the working groups, a consensus 
seems to have emerged that we should be talking about a new operating 
environment with a rise in range and complexity of missions. There seems 
to be no more reason to switch between “war” and “peace” situations, but 
                                                 
15 See article by Bernard Loo in this volume where he addresses the problem of limited 
resources and balancing between conventional military capabilities and new security 
roles.  
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of the deep interconnectedness of all the elements of threats, roles and 
capabilities. In other words, we are continuously in an unspecified space 
which can be defined as a crisis as Raimo Väyrynen did. The proper 
management of these crises entails a combination of various military and 
civilian capabilities. So it seems that the security challenges to modern 
societies constitute no longer a clear black-and-white picture, but more that 
of a complex whole with multiple elements. 
 
In this complicated setting, the armed forces can hardly be the only tool to 
manage any crisis. More likely, in Jørgen Berggrav’s words, armed forces 
must be used as a finely tuned instrument together with other governmental 
and non-governmental organisations in a comprehensive approach.16  Or, as 
Anu Laamanen put it, in the changing environment of action in crises, there 
should be no going back to separate action by the military or the civilians. 
The future of crisis management requires a full commitment by all crisis 
management actors of the international community.17 
 
A closely related and as such very significant feature seems to be the 
military’s gradually changing role in security: as the attention shifts from 
actual warfighting to “softer” and more difficultly defined issues such as 
security, stabilization and reconstruction, other powers and authorities 
seem to gain upper hand. Even though in many cases military victory may 
be indispensable, it will not guarantee success as such. Rather, the success 
will be measured by objectives beyond the simple military victory. 
 
The groups envision a smaller, more intelligent military to meet these 
demands. A number of concrete elements to be developed were pointed 
out, to the extent that the demands on tomorrow’s armed forces as 
perceived by working groups seem almost overwhelmingly diverse. While 
armed forces are expected both to sustain their traditional defence 
capabilities and to be prepared to participate in military as well as 
humanitarian missions in distant regions, they are simultaneously expected 
to efficiently cooperate with the civilian authorities and to have extensive 
knowledge of different cultures and languages. To fulfil these demands, 
future forces should be able to operate in changing roles of conventional 
soldier, military police, reconstruction worker and expert on civilian 
society’s institutions. 
 
However, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, regarding the above 
findings as a concrete development programme may mislead us simply 
because of the sheer difficulty of putting these ideas into reality at least on 
the national level. 
                                                 
16 See Jørgen Berggrav’s article in this volume. 
17 See Anu Laamanen’s article in this volume. 
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In the face of these versatile demands the nations should concentrate on 
two options: to prioritize and cooperate. Limited national resources are 
forcing nations to prioritize in which operations they are going to 
participate, most likely by considering which ones serve their national 
interest most and also respecting the demands produced by the possible 
alliances. International cooperation would be a logical choice to combine 
limited national resources and to complement each others’ deficiencies.  
 
Maybe the major future challenge lies in finding the balance between 
homeland defence and external missions, since that choice represents the 
division between traditional roles and capabilities and the new ones. 
Defining the relationship between traditional defence and new security 
threats is a fundamental question and requires difficult decisions which 
every nation is bound to make independently. As it was pointed out in one 
of the groups, perhaps the most important guideline for developing future 
armed forces would be to prepare to tolerate the continuing change and to 
be prepared to all kinds of changes. On the other hand, shouldn’t the ability 
to adapt to changes be regarded as one of the key qualities of any worthy 
military? 
 
 
A Final Word 
 
Thinking of the groupwork from the beneficial position of hindsight, one 
can establish that the results of this kind of assignment can only be as good 
as the original concept on which it is based. The groupwork task can indeed 
be subjected to critical re-evaluation. In addition, some choices made 
during the preparation did affect the outcomes of elaboration.  
 
One issue which some participants found confusing was the difficulty in 
defining a “generic western nation”. Undoubtedly, this reflected the 
heterogeneity of the groupwork participants. This was most likely related to 
a more subtle line of confusion related to the question of how much the 
setting and the outcome reflected the particularities of the Finnish situation 
versus the more general “Western” problemacy. Even though the 
organisers consciously tried to avoid imposing the Finnish military’s point 
of view onto groupwork, this was unavoidably reflected in the groupwork 
elaborations, since about half of the participants were Finnish. This likely 
played a big role also in the groups’ surprisingly strong support to 
conventional military capabilities.  
 
Another potential source of criticism was the proposed time-span from 
2007 to 2020, which was for some too short a period. The main argument 
behind this was that the systems are already in existence and thereby 
essentially reflect the present thinking. Yet, the opinions about this were 
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mixed, since for some other participants the time span was deemed to be 
too long to make any credible arguments. However, we may ask ourselves 
the question as to what extent is the understanding provided by the groups 
and by this article simply reflecting the perceived demands of the year 
2007 in stead of a genuinely long-term thinking. Naturally, this reflects the 
more general difficulty of trying to estimate the requirements and 
consequences of a future security environment. 
 
Neither should we ignore the psychological dimension in this exercise as 
another factor influencing the results. Often, the decision to form mixed 
groups produces results which are not likely to be very assertive or 
provocative. Quite a different, even though not necessarily better, outcome 
could have been reached if the groups were formed on the basis of clearly 
like-minded people, persons from similar professional backgrounds or on 
the basis of nationality. 
 
----- 
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the results of Suomenlinna 
Seminar’s two-day workshop highlight the increasing complexity of 
tomorrow’s security environment and the difficult challenges ahead. 
Simultaneourly, they give us a number of recommendations, at least in 
terms of directions into which we should proceed. The final recipe for 
tomorrow’s armed forces, if such a thing exists, may not have been 
disclosed in these sessions but most likely we now understand slightly 
better the nature of future threats and the ways armed forces could and 
should respond to them. Therefore, this is a most suitable occasion to once 
more express our gratitude to everyone who participated in the groupwork 
sessions, in particular for the chairmen for their dedicated work and for 
supporting staff for their careful documentation. This has been an 
opportunity to learn for us all - perhaps not least about our own thinking. 
 
Tommi Koivula is a senior researcher at the Department of Strategic and 
Defence Studies, National Defence University of Finland. Jyrki Helminen 
has worked as a research assistant at the same department. 
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